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Filling the Void: Judicial Power and
Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments
In any system of law there is a tension between the goal of resolving
disputes quickly and finally and that of assuring that the resolutions
so reached will be perceived as "fair" or "just." The recognition that
there must be agencies with power to resolve disputes has always been
tempered by the fear of arbitrary exercise of that power. This tension
has been reflected in judicial attitudes toward the relationship between
the jurisdiction of a court and the finality of its judgments. For over
three centuries it has been black-letter law that the judgment of a
court without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action be-
fore it' is null and void in its entirety.2 This "voidness doctrine" has
served to check excesses of judicial power, but only at some real cost
to finality; to say a judgment is void is to deny its existence and a
fortiori to deny that the underlying dispute has been resolved. As
cases have arisen in which the demands of finality appeared more im-
portant than the original excess of jurisdiction, courts have developed
doctrines to counter the voidness doctrine.3 In this century the excep-
tions have become the rule, but the voidness doctrine has not disap-
peared; courts and commentators alike have acknowledged at least
a small place for it.
4
This Note argues that the voidness doctrine deserves no place in
1. "Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action," for the purposes of this Note,
shall encompass all questions of a court's power over an action or class of actions except
the power to bind specific parties to judgment, which is referred to as "jurisdiction over
the person," or personal jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction as used here thus com-
prehends questions such as the types of cases a court may hear (e.g., criminal, divorce,
contract actions with a limited amount in controversy), what relief it may award, what
things it can affect, and so forth. See generally F. JAMEs, CIVIL PROCEDURE 536-37, 621-36
(1965); D. LoUISELL & G. HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE
269-70, 477-83 (3d ed. 1973); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 4-8 (1942) [hereinafter cited
without cross-reference as FIRST RESTATEMENT]. A rough but useful test for distinguishing
between the two broad categories of jurisdiction is that a question is one of personal
jurisdiction if it would be obviated by timely service of valid process in some specified
geographic area, and is otherwise one of subject-matter jurisdiction.
2. The Marshalsea, 10 Co. Rep. 68b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1613).
3. See pp. 169-71 infra.
4. See pp. 171-81 infra.
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modern American law. Part I examines the development of the doc-
trine in England and the United States and concludes that, when
viewed in light of the revolution in American procedural law in this
century, the doctrine's historical justifications are no longer persuasive.
Part II then develops a theory of judicial power based directly on so-
ciety's need for final resolution of disputes. Under this theory questions
of jurisdiction do not affect issues of judicial power; once a dispute
is settled, the fact of settlement is more important than the identity
of the court that acted. Part III analyzes the cases central to the void-
ness doctrine in terms of the theory developed in Part II and in terms
of the goals the cases purport to advance. This analysis renders the
conclusion that the cases were poorly decided on their own terms and
that there is, as a consequence, no legitimate obstacle to implemen-
tation of the theory of Part II. Finally, Part IV synthesizes the theory
of Part II into a simple rule for dealing with attacks on judgments.
I. Development of the Voidness Doctrine
A. Origins
The concept of jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action
grew up in England as a tool of the royal, or "superior," courts in
their power struggle with the local and ecclesiastical courts.5 The royal
courts-King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer-had nationwide
jurisdiction and asserted power to treat proceedings in a local court
not having jurisdiction as null and void from their inception. 6 Such
proceedings were coram non judice-"before one not a judge."7 By
5. See generally Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C.L. REv. 49
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Consent].
6. The leading case is The Marshalsea, 10 Co. Rep. 68b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1613).
See Consent, supra note 5, at 67-69. For an excellent and comprehensive treatment of the
development of the English voidness doctrine, as well as a discussion of its early impact
in the United States, see 1 J.W. SMITH, A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES ON VARIOUS
BRANCHES OF THE LAW 800-48 (5th Am. ed. J. Hare & J. Wallace 1855) (from d Eng.
ed. H. Keating & J. Willes 1849) (Ist ed. London 1837) [hereinafter cited as SMNiT's
LEADING CAsEs].
7. This assertion of power was made in two ways. First, the royal court could issue a
writ of prohibition to the lower court, forbidding the lower court from proceeding further
with an action over which it purportedly had no jurisdiction. This method was used
extensively to curb the powers of the ecclesiastical courts. E.g., Harrison v. Burwell, 2
Ventr. 9, 86 Eng. Rep. 278 (K.B. 1670) (writ lies to prevent erroneous dissolution of
valid marriage); see Consent, supra note 5, at 60-61 & n.58 (citing cases). Second, once the
judgment had been executed, the defendant could sue the judge who entered it and the
officer who executed it in trespass; liability would hinge on whether the judge and
officers could sustain a defense of immunity, i.e., whether the judgment was valid or
void. E.g., Crepps v. Durden, 2 Cowp. 640, 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1777); The Marshalsea,
10 Co. Rep. 68b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1613).
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contrast, there seems to be no case in which the judgment of one of
the superior courts was held to be void.8 The English voidness doc-
trine was used exclusively to subject the local and ecclesiastical courts
to royal supervision.
Upon importation into the United States the doctrine expanded
greatly, a result traceable for the most part to the existence of compet-
ing sovereignties in a federal union. There were no courts exactly com-
parable to the English royal courts: the national courts had explicitly
limited jurisdiction and the state courts, although usually possessing
general common law powers,9 did not have nationwide process. 10 It is
thus not surprising that the voidness doctrine took on an added di-
mension in the United States in the nineteenth century. In purely
intrastate cases, as in England, the doctrine was used only to control
8. There was apparently general agreement that such a judgment could be held to
be void, at least if a royal court issued a writ that it had no authority to issue. Gosset v.
Howard, 10 Q.B. 411, 453, 116 Eng. Rep. 158, 173 (Exch. Ch. 1847); The Marshalsea, 10
Co. Rep. 68b, 76b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027, 1039 (K.B. 1613). In Gosset, however, Baron Parke
went so far as to say
[i]t appears, indeed, that, if a writ of a Superior Court expressed no cause at all, it
would be legal ....
... In case of an improper exercise of the power of attachment by a Court of Law
or Equity, . . . there can be no appeal: the only remedy is by application to the
sense of justice of each Court: and it would be improper to suppose that any one
of them would be more likely to abuse the power, or less likely to grant redress,
than another.
10 Q.B. at 455, 457, 116 Eng. Rep. at 174. See also Consent, supra note 5, at 77 n.145.
Prigg v. Adams, Carthew 274, 90 Eng. Rep. 762 (K.B. 1694) (digested at 2 Salk. 674, 91
Eng. Rep. 573), illustrates Baron Parke's statement. In that case a judgment for five
shillings rendered by a royal court, the Court of Common Pleas, was sustained against
an attack based on an Act of Parliament granting a local court exclusive jurisdiction of
actions for less than 40 shillings and explicitly declaring any judgment of a royal court
for such less amount to be void. Because the prior action was one normally cognizable
in the Court of Common Pleas, the judgment was held to be "voidable" only, i.e., subject
to attack only by motion to vacate addressed to the rendering court, or by writ of
error. The seemingly absolute invulnerability of the judgments of the superior courts,
however, held only at law. Equity could and did intervene on a number of grounds to
enjoin enforcement of judgments. Such intervention worked on the parties and did not
in principle reach the validity vel non of the judgment. See p. 170 & notes 31-34 infra.
9. But there were, for example, no courts of equity in Pennsylvania at the time of
the Revolution, and jurisdiction to award equitable remedies was conferred by statute
only. See, e.g., Davis v. Gerhard, 5 Whart. 466, 470 (Pa. 1840); Pollard v. Shaaffer, I
Dall. 210, 213 (Pa. 1787). But see id. (oath of judges bound them to "determine causes
according to equity as well as the positive law; equity being a part of the law").
10. See p. 168 and notes 14 & 16 infra. Congress has not often granted nationwide
process to federal courts, but it has done so in some circumstances, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1970) (actions under Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1970) (inter-
pleader actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970)). Its power to do so without limitation has
been questioned, see Abraham, Constitutional Limitations upon the Territorial Reach of
Federal Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520 (1963), but it would, for example, be impossible for
the Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction without nationwide process. See
SUP. CT. R. 9(3), 9(7), 33(1).
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overreaching by inferior courts.'1 But it was also applied in interstate
cases as a check on territorial overreaching by state courts,' 2 and it
saw duty in both state and federal courts against perceived intrusions
by one upon the other's domain.' 3
11. Where a judgment was attacked in the state in which it was rendered the rules
applied closely resembled the English doctrine. A judgment of a court of inferior juris-
diction had to show on its face the facts necessary to support the exercise of jurisdiction,
and these facts could generally be controverted by extrinsic evidence, including parol
evidence. See, e.g., Spoors v. Coen, 44 Ohio St. 497 (1886); 1 SMITH's LEADING CASES, supra
note 6, at 828, 830-32, 843. As in England, a judgment of a domestic court of general
jurisdiction "imported absolute verity" and could not be impeached by parol or other
extrinsic evidence. E.g., Sheldon's Lessee v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494, 498-500 (1854). See I
SMITH's LEADING CAsEs. supra note 6, at 820, 823-24, 826-28. This was true even with
respect to recitals of service of process. Id. at 841-42. A person against whom a judgment
was obtained without notice was required to look "to his remedy against those by whom
the record has been falsified." Id. at 834. See generally A. FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF JUDGMENTS 107-12, 417-19 (1873). "General jurisdiction" referred to proceedings
in the course of the common law or in equity, and when a court with such jurisdiction
exercised statutory authority which did not fall into one of those two categories, its
judgments were subject to the same scrutiny as those of courts of inferior jurisdiction.
E.g., Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 495, 536-40 (1850); Gunn v. Howell, 27 Ala.
683 (1855); Whitten v. Coit, 153 Colo. 157, 174-75, 385 P.2d 131, 140-41 (1963). See I
S.ITH's LEADING CASES, supra note 6, at 832-33; A. FREEMAN, supra at 94-96 (recognizing
rule but questioning its wisdom).
12. E.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Before Pennoyer, territorial sovereignty
questions generally arose in cases where full faith and credit was demanded in the courts
of one state for a judgment of the courts of another. E.g., D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52
U.S. (11 How.) 165, 175-76 (1850); see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729-33 (1877). D'Arcy
cites no authority for its holding, but a good development of the interaction between
territorial sovereignty notions and the full faith and credit clause appears in the con-
temporary case of Moulin v. Trenton Mut. Life & Fire Ins. Co., 24 N.J.L. 222, 235-45
(Sup. Ct. 1853) (opinion of Haines, J.) (following D'Arcy); accord, id. at 230-35 (opinion
of Elmer, J.).
In full faith and credit cases the jurisdiction of the rendering court was frequently
open to extrinsic disproof (including parol evidence), see A. FREEMAN, supra note 11, at
'166-67, which was generally not the practice when domestic judgments were called into
question, see note 11 supra. Allowing extrinsic disproof in full faith and credit cases was
sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 463-68
(1873) (citing earlier dicta). This difference between rules applied to domestic and
foreign judgments illustrates the concern of the nineteenth-century voidness cases with
overreaching by courts of other sovereignties.
13. E.g., Lessee of Hickey v. Stewart, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 750 (1845) (Mississippi court
without jurisdiction to settle title to certain lands ceded by Georgia, where Act accepting
cession prescribed different procedure); Slocum v. Wheeler, I Conn. 429 (1816) (admiralty
decree void where prize captured on land and condemned in wrong district); Taylor v.
Carryl, 24 Pa. 259 (1855) (common law foreign attachment of vessel not defeated by
subsequent maritime lien in rein; replevin granted buyer at state sheriff's sale against
buyer at federal marshal's sale), aJJ'd, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583 (1857); Nulton v. Isaacs,
71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 726, 739-42 (1878) (order of United States Circuit Court, compelling
payment, void as judgment). The Supreme Court affirmance in Taylor was by a five-to-
four vote. Chief Justice Taney, joined by Justices Wayne, Grier, and Clifford, dis-
sented on the ground that the state attachment reached only the defendant's interest
in the vessel, not the vessel itself, and that the marshal's sale therefore passed clear
title to the vessel. 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 600-03. He did not, however, dispute that a
federal judgment could be void if the federal court were exercising common law powers
and attempted to pass title to a res under control of a state court. See id. at 606-09.
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The dimension added by the structure of the American polity was
firmly grounded in perceptions of the limited nature of government.
In Justice Story's words, "no sovereignty can extend its process be-
yond its territorial limits, to subject either persons or property to its
judicial decisions. Every exertion of authority beyond this limit is a
mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property in
any other tribunals."'1 State courts might be bound by full faith and
credit to respect foreign judgments, but they were entitled to ascer-
tain that their own sovereign prerogatives were not being infringed
upon and that their citizens were not being subjected improperly to
the dominion of a foreign state. This conception of judicial process
is epitomized by Pennoyer v. Neff,'5 which wrote Justice Story's views
on territorial sovereignty into the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'16
The cases holding judgments void for reasons other than territorial
overreaching lacked a unifying theme. Nevertheless, in such diverse
areas as admiralty17 and estate contests' s they too spoke in terms of
power. Some cases, like the English cases before them,' 9 leave the dis-
tinct impression that the court was reaching for a jurisdictional issue
14. Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 612 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134) (Story,
Circuit Justice). Thus, originally, personal appearance could be compelled and a party
bound to judgment only by arrest of the body. Id. at 613; see Hazard, A General
Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 241, 248 n.19. Within its own
borders a state might create whatever substitutes for arrest it deemed sufficient, but
when it tried to export its judgments, courts of other states required that the record
show service of process within the state or voluntary appearance-actions that clearly
showed that the state could have arrested the party sought to be bound, or that he
had waived "arrest." E.g., Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308, 316-19 (1870);
D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850); Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9
How.) 336, 348-49 (1850). Absent such a showing the decree would be "utterly void."
Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 612 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134) (Story, Circuit
Justice).
15. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
16. Id. at 721-27, 733; see Hazard, supra note 14, at 262-72. Justice Story viewed
the necessary nexus between territorial sovereignty and judicial jurisdiction as a prin-
ciple "recognized at the common law," but having, "to a certain extent at least, a foun-
dation also in universal jurisprudence." Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 612 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134) (Story, Circuit Justice). His interpretation has been challenged
as being an incorrect restatement of the law as it then stood. See Hazard, supra note
14, at 261. There is, however, no doubt that it did become the law. Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1877); see Hazard, supra note 14, at 262.
17. E.g., Town of Pelham v. The Schooner B.F. Woolsey, 3 F. 457 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub
nom. Terrell v. The Schooner B.F. Woolsey, 4 F. 552 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880) (prior state
judgment void as within exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction); Slocum v. Wheeler, 1
Conn. 429 (1816) (federal judgment in prize case void because prize captured on land and
condemned in wrong district).
18. Elliott v. Lessee of Peirsol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328 (1828) (failure to follow precise
statutory form for conveyance by feme covert voids judgment).
19. See pp. 165-66 & notes 5-8 supra.
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to enable it to avoid the effects of an inconvenient prior judgment.
20
Alongside the voidness doctrine was a line of cases that represented
attempts to limit the scope of the doctrine. These decisions were de-
scendants of the presumption of regularity due judgments of the
royal courts of superior jurisdiction. 21 In the United States that pre-
sumption developed into the notion that some issues, though cast in
terms of power, were not "strictly jurisdictional," but merely "quasi
jurisdictional."22 These issues were said to involve "preliminary fact[s]
necessary to be proven to authorize the court to act";2 3 where they
were involved a court could be said to have the power to determine
the question of its power. Its determination, if wrong, was "mere
error" and did not result in a void judgment.
24
In the federal courts, the most important example of a quasi-juris-
dictional issue was diversity of citizenship as a basis for federal juris-
diction. Although the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to
the nine categories enumerated in article III of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court early held that a judgment in a diversity action need
not affirmatively show the presence of diversity in order to be valid.2 5
This was merely a holding that the federal courts, although "limited,"
were not "inferior," and that, consequently, their judgments were en-
20. See, e.g., Nulton v. Isaacs, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 726, 738-43 (1878) (in suit to set
aside allegedly fraudulent conve)ances, prior federal judgments held ineffective as liens
because of asserted jurisdictional defect, but partial relief granted on other grounds).
But see, e.g., Town of Pelham v. The Schooner B.F. Woolsey, 3 F. 457 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
sub non. Terrell v. The Schooner B.F. Woolsey, 4 F. 552 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880) (arriving at
essentially same result on merits as prior judgment found to be void). Jurisdiction
was to be determined by "the face of the record." See note 11 supra. Courts eager to
a~oid a prior judgment have therefore taken expansive views of what constitutes a
facial defect. See, e.g., Nulton v. Isaacs, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 726, 739-42 (1878). For an
egregious modern example, see Farley v. Farley, 227 Cal. App. 2d 1, 38 Cal. Rptr. 357
(1964), where a portion of a Utah divorce decree was held void as beyond the statu-
tory powers of a Utah divorce court. The Utah court, which had general equity
powers, had imposed a trust on some land owned by the husband, with the wife as
trustee and the couple's children as both beneficiaries and, upon achieving majority,
remaindermen. The California court found Utah law to be silent on the powers of
divorce courts to create such remainder interests in favor of adult children and thus
applied California law to hold tse Utah decree void on its face.
21. See In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 221 (1888) (citing both Prigg v. Adams, Carthew
274, 90 Eng. Rep. 762 (K.B. 1694) (digested at 2 Salk. 674, 91 Eng. Rep. 573) (discussed
in note 8 supra), and Des Moines Navigation & R.R. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U.S. 552
(1887) (discussed at p. 170 infra; see also note 151 infra), for proposition that errors
as to certain facts "which might or might not support the jurisdiction" do not render
decree void).
22. Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 173 (1893). For similar lan-
guage in a state case, see Abraham v. Honer, 102 Okla. 12, 14-15, 226 P. 45, 47-48 (1924).
23. Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 174 (1893).
24. E.g., id. at 173-74; Wyatt's Adm'r v. Steel. 26 Ala. 639, 650 (1855); Bumstead v.
Read, 31 Barb. 661, 669-70 (App. Div. 1859); see Kohl v. Hannaford, 5 Ohio Dec. Re-
print 306 (Super. Ct. 1875).
25. M'Cormick v. Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192 (1825).
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titled to the presumption of regularity due judgments of superior
courts.26 Some years later, however, the Court went much further. In
Des Moines Navigation & Railroad v. Iowa Homestead Co.,27 it held
that a judgment was immune to attack on grounds of want of diversity
even when the defect was shown on the face of the record. 28 Although
the Court mentioned the respect due the "'limited but not . . . in-
ferior' " federal courts, 29 the new rationale was far broader than the
earlier one. It was based upon the need for finality and it emphasized
the responsibility of litigants to raise jurisdictional issues in the original
litigation.30
Both the voidness doctrine and the countervailing line of cases in-
volved attacks on judgments at law. In addition, equitable relief from
judgments was occasionally available, both in England and the United
States.31 Since James I settled the conflict between Lord Chief Justice
Coke and Lord Chancellor Ellesmere in 1613,32 courts of equity have
had the undisputed power to enjoin enforcement of judgments of the
law courts, including the superior courts, on a number of grounds.
33
Even so, the right to equitable relief was not unfettered. Equitable
attacks were first and foremost proceedings in equity, and as such were
subject to equitable defenses such as unclean hands and laches.
34
26. Id. at 199-200.
27. 123 U.S. 552 (1887).
28. Id. at 556-59.
29. Id. at 557-58 (quoting M'Corrnick) (emphasis omitted).
30. Id. at 558-59. The existence of a federal question has also been held to be quasi-
jurisdictional. Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U.S. 327, 340 (1894).
Among state courts, a typical quasi-jurisdictional issue (although that language was
not used) was domicile for probate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bumstead v. Read, 31 Barb. 661
(App. Div. 1859); A. FREEMAN, supra note 11, at 442. For a discussion of probate cases
applying a strictly jurisdictional standard, see Jochumsen v. Suffolk Savings Bank, 85
Mass. (3 Allen) 87, 89-96 (1861).
31. See A. FREEMAN, supra note 11, at 409; F. JAMEs, supra note 1, at 13-16; FIRST
RESTATEMENT § 112.
32. See F. JAMES, supra note 1, at 15. It is worthy of note that The Marshalsea, 10
Co. Rep. 68b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (1613), which established the voidness doctrine in the
law courts, see pp. 165-66 supra, was also decided-and by Lord Coke-in 1613.
33. See 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 165-78 (2d ed. Boston
1839) (Ist ed. Boston 1835). These grounds included equitable defenses to the original
action, see id. at 170-71, and could generally be asserted either before or after judgment
at law. See id. at 173, 178-79. In particular, the equity courts would act to prevent
enforcement of judgments procured by fraud. See id. at 172-73; cf. FIRST RESTATEMENT §§
118, 120-124 (rule as of 1942). The rule that judgments of superior courts imported
absolute verity, see note 11 supra, might thus have rested in part on the view that it
was not outrageous to deny parties the right to controvert the face of the record at
law if they could do so in a suit for equitable relief. See, e.g., Ridgeway v. Batik of
Tenn., 30 Tenn. (11 Humph.) 523 (1851); cf. A. FREEMAN, supra note 11, at 417-19
(equity "peculiarly appropriate" for exposure of want of service). But cf. Walker v.
Robbins, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 584 (1852) (dictum) (where false recital not due to plaintiff's
fault or fraud, equity will not intervene).
34. See A. FREEMAN, supra note 11, at 425-27; FIRST RESTATEMENT §§ 127-130.
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The three doctrinal strands-voidness, jurisdiction to determine jur-
isdiction, and equity35-stood alongside one another for many years,
with only the most cursory acknowledgment of each other's existence.
Despite attempts of treatise writers to codify and to classify, by 1925
the state of the law of judgments could charitably be described as
confused.3
6
The voidness doctrine developed in England to establish the suprem-
acy of the royal courts; it flourished in the United States in the
nineteenth century primarily as a means for states to protect their
citizens against overreaching by courts of other states. In both coun-
tries it functioned to protect the prerogatives of some courts at the
expense of others. As Professor Dobbs has noted, however, "almost
every reason that history suggests to support the [voidness doctrine]
has disappeared." 37 He continued:
Even the problems of our own federal system do not measure up
to the heated conflict of the English courts. We need not look to
the jurisdictional concept to gain adequate appellate review of
cases otherwise barred from revision. A written constitution gives
us a basis for insuring reasonable rules of law and procedure
wholly independent of the jurisdictional concept....
Furthermore, it is apparent today that the problem of our judi-
cial system is the problem of overburden rather than under-work,
the problem of finality rather than the problem of injustice. When
the no consent rule [i.e., the voidness doctrine] was developing,
res judicata was not the significant legal tool that it is today, and
the policies of res judicata were not weighed in the balance.3s
B. The Modern Doctrine
A doctrine whose historical justifications have receded with time
is not likely to survive unchanged. The voidness doctrine is no ex-
ception. The second quarter of this century saw the beginning of a
35. The importance of the independent equitable attack on a judgment has declined
somewhat since the inclusion in 1938 of most of the grounds for such attacks into post-
judgment relief by motion. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (discussed in note 45 infra).
36. The fifth edition of Freeman's Treatise on the Law of Judgments, published in
1925, had grown to three volumes from the original one. All the doctrinal strands
appeared, constituting most of Chapters VII and XXI, but it is difficult to abstract
from the Treatise any sense that one could determine which strand would be applied
in any particular case. For an earlier example of the confusion, see Justice Brown's
attempt to distinguish "strictly jurisdictional" questions from "quasi jurisdictional"
ones in Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1893).
37. Consent, supra note 5, at 78.
38. Id. at 78-79.
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procedural revolution in the United States; 39 that revolution has had
a significant impact both on the voidness doctrine and on the broader
question of the nature of judicial power.
40
The revolution was characterized by an emphasis on functional in-
dicia of fairness, both in shaping current litigation and in determin-
ing the impact of prior litigation. Thus the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, adopted in 1938, emphasized a flexible approach to liti-
gation, with notice pleading4 ' complemented by broad discovery42 and
with liberal joinder of claims 43 and parties. 44 The object was to pro-
vide as fair and effective a method as possible for the resolution of
disputes. 45 At the same time, the constitutionalization of notice re-
quirements for personal jurisdiction imposed a fairness constraint on
the exercise of judicial power: a party who has not had an oppor-
tunity to contest a claim against him is not bound by a judgment
entered on that claim. 46 This development of notice as a necessary
39. See, e.g., Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 741-42 (1976); Vestal,
Res JudicatalPreclusion: Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 357-59 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Expansion].
40. See pp. 174-81 infra.
41. FEn. R. Civ. P. 8.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 13, 18.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 14, 19-21, 24.
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b) (amendment of pleadings to con-
form to evidence), 16 (pre-trial conference). For a general discussion of the differences
between the Rules and prior practice, see D. LoUISELL & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 35-38.
The accommodation the Rules found between finality and justice is found in Rules
55(c) (setting aside default) and 60 (relief from judgment). As originally adopted in
1938, Rule 60 did not mention voidness, but the 1946 revision added as a ground for
relief that "the judgment is void." FED. R. Cv. P. 60(b)(4). The addition of this ground
was not adverted to in the Advisory Committee Notes except insofar as voidness was
encompassed by the common law post-judgment writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, and
audita querela, which were subsumed by the rule. See Notes of Advisory Committee on
1946 Amendment to Rules, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. (1970) (following Rule 60). The
1946 Amendment was a revision by Professor Moore of the original proposal of the
Advisory Committee. See Moore & Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55 YALE
L.J. 623, 690-93 & n.272 (1946) (article cited frequently in Advisory Committee Notes).
Professor Moore has stated that the addition of 60(b)(4) was agreed to without difficulty
and was regarded simply as a housekeeping measure. Telephone Conlersation with J.W.
Moore, April 12, 1977 (notes on file with Yale Law Journal). Thus the entire "legislatie
history" of Rule 60(b)(4) is the statement that "the rule should recognize that a court
can purge its records of void judgments." Moore & Rogers, supra, at 692.
46. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (due process forbids notice of
condemnation proceedings solely by publication where condeniee known); Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15, 318-19 (1950) (in action to
settle trustee's accounts, due process requires notice "reasonably calculated" to inform
all reasonably identifiable beneficiaries); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (state
may declare use of highways equhalent to appointment of state official as "agent" to
receive service of process, but provision for making actual notice to defendant "rea-
sonably probable" nevertheless required in order to bind him). See FroST RESTATEMENT
§ 6; Hazard, supra note 14, at 275-77.
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condition for the exercise of judicial power was accompanied by the
expansion of state "longarm" jurisdiction, beginning in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,4 7 which went in the direction of making
notice a sufficient condition as well. The determinant of state judicial
power began to shift from the territorial sovereignty of Pennoyer to
a pragmatic, fairness-oriented test of sufficient contacts between party
and forum to justify exercise of judicial power.
48
The increased emphasis on fairness in the process of litigation made
possible an expansion of the binding effect of judgments. Having been
provided a fair opportunity to settle an entire dispute in one action,
a party might reasonably be precluded from reopening the matter. In
part, the influence of liberal joinder rules in expanding the notion
of "cause of action" brought a parallel expansion in those rules of
res judicata/preclusion49 that are designed to prevent more than one
litigation of a single cause of action.5° There were other, less auto-
matic developments, however, notably Justice Traynor's decision in
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Savings & Trust Association.51
47. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). But see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In Hanson
the Court appeared to return at least part way to Pennoyer's emphasis on territorial
sovereignty. See id. at 249-52. The case has been sharply criticized, see Hazard, supna
note 14, at 243-45, but it has also been followed, e.g., Bernardi Bros., Inc. v. Pride
Mfg., Inc., 427 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1970). See generally R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY,
CONFLICT OF LAws 526-28 (2d ed. 1975). The viability of Hanson after the recent decision
in Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977) (discussed in note 48 infra), is unclear. See id.
at 2580 n.20, 2584 n.38, 2586-87 (discussing Hanson in varying terms). For a discussion of
the relation between personal jurisdiction and due process, see note 92 infra.
48. See Hazard, supra note 14, at 281-88.
The shift away from Pennoyer appears to have been completed by the recent decision
in Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977). At issue in Shaffer was the validity of a
statute permitting Delaware courts to obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
by "sequestering" any of defendant's property located in Delaware. Id. at 2572. After
reviewing the development of state jurisdiction from Pennoyer to International Shoe, id.
at 2576-81, the Court concluded:
The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion
of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient form without
substantial modern justification. Its continued acceptance would serve only to allow
state court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.
We therefore conclude that all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.
Id. at 2584-85 (footnote omitted). Pennoyer and Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), were
overruled "[tio the extent that [they] are inconsistent with this standard." Id. at 2585
n.39. The Court then found that, under the test of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958) (discussed in note 47 supra), the defendants did not hase sufficient contacts with
Delaware to permit Delaware to exercise jurisdiction over them. 97 S. Ct. at 2585-87.
49. For a development of the theory of res judicata/preclusion, see pp. 184-88 & notes
99-120 infra.
50. See D. LouISELL & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 619-22.
51. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) (Traynor, J.). In what has been called "a
triumph of judicial statesmanship," B. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits
of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 285 (1957), Justice Traynor abolished
the "mutuality rule" of collateral estoppel-the doctrine that a determination of an issue,
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The impact of the procedural revolution on the voidness doctrine
was not long in making itself felt. The Supreme Court,52 in a series
of decisions between 1931 and 1963-with the main decisions coming in
a sixteen-month period between 1938 and 1940-fundamentally altered
the relationship between finality and judicial power in the United
States. First, in Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Association,5
3
the Court held that a party who had appeared in the prior action
to contest the forum's jurisdiction over his person was bound by an
adverse determination and could not subsequently attack the judgment
on jurisdictional grounds.54 Then, in 1938, in Stoll v. Gottlieb,' the
in litigation between A and B, adversely to A, was generally not binding on A in a
subsequent litigation between A and C. See FIRsT RESTATEMENT § 93(b). Justice Traynoi
replaced the mutuality rule with a three-step test for determining whether A would
be bound in the action against C: "Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
identical with the one presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment
on the merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity
with a party to the prior adjudication?" 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895. In so
doing he made general the prior exceptions to mutuality that had rested "on the ground
that it would be unjust to permit one who has had his day in court to reopen identical
issues by merely switching adversaries." Id.
52. The Court's decisions are controlling precedent only where the federal law of
judgments is involved, but its decisions have nevertheless had great impact. First, of
course, the Court's prestige adds weight to its decisions when, acting as a common law
court, it lays out the federal common law of judgments. More important, however, is
that many cases raise federal questions. The scope of a federal judgment is a federal
question. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1938); Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3
(1882) (construing predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970) (full faith and credit statute));
see Degnan, supra note 39, at 746-49. So, too, is the effect of a judgment of a court of
one state in the courts of another. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439
(1943). In full faith and credit cases the scope of the judgment is controlled by the
law of the rendering state, Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 587 (1951), but the
determination of that law raises a federal question, id. at 585.
53. 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
54. But cf. In re Stern, 235 F. Supp. 680, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (Weinfeld, J.) (Baldwin
not applicable where appeal from jurisdictional ruling dismissed for failure to post bond).
55. 305 U.S. 165 (1938). Accord, Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.S. 494 (1941);
Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938).
In Stoll, Gottlieb was a bondholder of a corporation in reorganization under § 77B
of the Bankruptcy Act, Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 912 (superseded by Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970)). Stoll had guaranteed some of
the corporation's bonds, including those held by Gottlieb. At a creditors' meeting (of
which Gottlieb had notice but which he did not attend) a reorganization plan was
devised that included a provision for extinguishing the Stoll guarantees, and the plan
was approved by the supervising district court. Gottlieb's petition to have the plan set
aside, on the ground that extinguishing the guarantees was beyond the power of the
bankruptcy court, was denied, and Gottlieb did not appeal. Instead, he sued Stoll on
the guarantees in the Illinois courts, and judgment in favor of Gottlieb was upheld by
the Illinois Supreme Court on the ground that the bankruptcy court had not had the
power to extinguish the guarantees. Gottlieb v. Crowe, 368 Ill. 88, 12 N.E.2d 881 (1937),
rev'd sub noma. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938). The United States Supreme Court,
in reversing, held that the bankruptcy court's unappealed determination of the extent
of its power was res judicata because the issue had been fully litigated in the bankruptcy
court. 305 U.S. at 172.
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Court extended the Baldwin doctrine to cover at least some issues of
subject-matter jurisdiction. In short order-in Treinies v. Sunshine
Mining Co. 0 and Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State
Bankr5 7-Stoll was extended to establish that most judgments are not
subject to attack for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.58 The link
between jurisdiction and power was crumbling. Stoll, Treinies, and
Chicot each rejected a substantial voidness-based attack with sweeping
fairness/finality language; together, these cases demolished, with one
glaring exception, the voidness doctrine as it had developed in the
nineteenth century. In essence, the inquiry was to be shifted from
the power vel non of the rendering court to the conduct of the par-
ties before it.
Despite this fundamental shift in emphasis the voidness doctrine
56. 308 U.S. 66 (1939). Treinies was an interpleader action instituted by Sunshine
after Washington and Idaho courts had entered conflicting judgments concerning title
to a block of Sunshine stock. The Washington court's judgment came first; it awarded
the stock to one of the claimants after its jurisdiction had been tested in prohibition
proceedings in the Washington Supreme Court. 308 U.S. at 69-70. The Idaho court
nevertheless concluded that the Washington court did not have jurisdiction and found
in favor of the other claimant. Mason v. Pelkes, 57 Idaho 10, 59 P.2d 1087 (1936),
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 615 (1937). When the conflicting judgments reached the United
States Supreme Court in the interpleader case, the Court held that the Idaho judgment
must control. The asserted ground for that judgment's invalidity-the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Washington court-had been litigated in the Idaho case and was therefore
res judicata. 308 U.S. at 74-78. In concluding a litigation that had involved the Idaho
and Washington-and, finally, the federal-courts, the Court said: "One trial of an issue
is enough. 'The principles of res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as
to other issues,' as well to jurisdiction of the subject matter as of the parties." 308
U.S. at 78 (footnotes omitted).
57. 308 U.S. 371 (1940). The Drainage District had been reorganized under the first
Municipal Bankruptcy Act, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798 (1934), which was subsequently held
to be unconstitutional in Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One,
298 U.S. 513 (1936). The bank had had notice of the reorganization proceedings but
had not participated in them. It did not tender its bonds pursuant to the plan, choosing
instead (after Ashton) to sue for payment. The Supreme Court held that the judgment
confirming the plan could not be attacked collaterally: although jurisdiction had been
purely statutory and the jurisdictional statute may have been unconstitutional, even an
unconstitutional statute may generate reliance interests worthy of judicial protection.
308 U.S. at 374. In addition, the Court emphasized that the bondholders had had an
opportunity to raise the jurisdictional question in the original action and were not
"privileged to remain quiet and raise it in a subsequent suit." Id. at 378. At the
heart of the opinion was the assertion that
[w]hatever the contention as to jurisdiction may be, whether it is that the bound-
aries of a valid statute have been transgressed, or that the statute itself is invalid,
the question of jurisdiction is still one for judicial determination. . . . There can
be no doubt that if the question of the constitutionality of the statute had ac-
tually been raised and decided in the District Court . . . , that determination would
have been final save as it was open to direct review upon appeal. [citing Stoll].
Id. at 377-78 (footnote omitted).
58. See generally Boskey & Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack: October
Terin, 1939, 40 CoLumr. L. REv. 1006 (1940); Note. Res Judicata and Jurisdiction: The
Bootstrap Doctrine, 53 HARV. L. REv. 652 (1940).
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did not entirely disappear, for the Court twice invoked it to pre-
serve important national policies. In Kalb v. Feuerstein"9 the Kalbs
sued to cancel a sheriff's deed issued at the sale following foreclo-
sure of the mortgage on their farm.60 The sale was confirmed while
the Kalbs' petition for composition and extension of time to pay their
debts, filed under the second Frazier-Lemke Act,6 was pending in fed-
eral district court. The Act provided that the "filing of a petition ...
shall immediately subject the farmer and all his property, wherever
located, . . . to the exclusive jurisdiction of the [federal district]
court. ' 62 Further, the Act explicitly prohibited confirmation of fore-
closure sales during the pendency of a petition. 63 The Kalbs asserted
that the jurisdiction of the state court had been ousted by the pendency
of the petition, so that the confirmation decree was void. The Wis-
consin courts held the Kalbs to be precluded from attacking the de-
cree because they had not sought a stay of the foreclosure proceedings
from the district court, nor had they raised the pendency of the pe-
tition in the foreclosure court.
64
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that the Frazier-Lemke Act
deprived state courts of "the power and jurisdiction to continue or
maintain" foreclosure proceedings "in any manner" after a petition
59. 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
60. The Kalbs also sued the sheriff for conspiracy to deprive them of possession,
for false imprisonment, and for assault and battery. They based their claims on a less-
than-peaceful execution of a writ of assistance sued out to put the Feuersteins in posses-
sion. See id. at 436-37. The suit against the sheriff is reminiscent of English voidness
actions, discussed in note 7 supra.
61. Act of Aug. 28, 1935, ch. 792, 49 Stat. 942; see 11 U.S.C. § 203 note (1970) (ex-
planation of Act's current status). The judgment of foreclosure was entered April 21,
1933, but under Wisconsin law no sale could be made or advertised for one year there-
after. More than a year later, on October 2, 1934, the Kalbs filed their petition in
the federal court, pursuant to the first Frazier-Lemke Act, ch. 869, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934).
That Act was held unconstitutional in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,
295 U.S. 555 (1935) (provision in Act for mandatory sale of farm by mortgagee back to
mortgagor at price less than secured debt constitutes uncompensated taking in violation
of Fifth Amendment), and the district court thereupon dismissed the petition. When
Congress amended the Act to remove the offending language, the district court vacated
the order of dismissal and reinstated the petition. Between the dismissal and the re-
instatement, however, the farm was sold at a sheriff's sale, although a confirmation
hearing (necessary to pass title) was not held until after the petition was reinstated.
Brief of the Appellants in Nos. 120 & 121, at 4-5; Brief of the Respondents in No. 121
at 3-4.
62. Second Frazier-Lemke Act, ch. 792, § 4, 49 Stat. 942 (1935).
63. Id.
64. Kalb v. Luce, 228 Wis. 519, 523-24, 279 N.W. 687, on rehearing, 280 N.W. 725,
726, appeal dismissed for want of final judgment, 305 U.S. 566 (1938), adhered to on
remand, 231 Wis. 186, 285 N.W. 431 (1939), rev'd sub nom. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308
U.S. 433 (1940). The Kalbs had served a copy of the reinstatement order on the state
judge three days before the confirmation hearing and had filed another copy in the
state court on the day originally set for the hearing. Brief of the Appellants in Nos.
120 & 121 at 5, Kalb v. Feuersteiu, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). See pp. 209-10 & note 209 infra.
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was filed,65 and it stressed that normal res judicata rules, such as
those applied in Stoll and Chicot, "are not applicable where the ple-
nary power of Congress over bankruptcy has been exercised as in
this Act." 6
In Kalb the Court purported to rely on a statute. In United States
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,67 however, the Court applied
the voidness doctrine because of the absence of a statute. Two Indian
Nations had leased coal lands to a company that subsequently went
into receivership; Fidelity was the surety for royalties due under the
lease.08 The Government, on behalf of the Indians, filed a claim for
the royalties in bankruptcy proceedings, but the receiver denied lia-
bility and counterclaimed for certain credits; the bankruptcy court
found a balance due the company.0 9 The Government did not appeal
but, prior to entry of the final decree, sued on the royalty bond in
another district. Fidelity pleaded the final decree of the bankruptcy
court as a bar to this second suit, and the receiver intervened as a
defendant and counterclaimed for recognition of his judgment. The
Government responded that the bankruptcy court had been without
jurisdiction to do more than allow a setoff, since absent a congres-
sional waiver both the United States and its Indian wards were pro-
tected against affirmative claims by sovereign immunity.70 The Su-
preme Court held that the failure to object to the award in the
bankruptcy proceedings was not fatal, since
the suability of the United States and the Indian Nations, wheth-
er directly or by cross-action, depends upon affirmative statu-
tory authority. . . .Absent that consent, the attempted exercise
of judicial power is void. The failure of officials to seek review
cannot give force to this exercise of judicial power. Public policy
forbids the suit unless consent is given, as clearly as public policy
makes jurisdiction exclusive by declaration of the legislative body
[citing Kalb]. Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State
Bank is inapplicable where the issue is the waiver of immunity.71
The modern voidness doctrine, as framed by the Court in the five
cases discussed above, retains, but in a sharply limited way, the concept
65. 308 U.S. at 440.
66. Id. at 444.
67. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
68. Brief for the United States at 3-4, United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
69. Id. at 5-6.
70. Id. at 6-7. For a discussion of the precise contours of the claim of immunity, in-
eluding an argument that there had in fact been a waiver, see note 246 infra.
71. 309 U.S. at 514 (footnotes omitted).
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of excess of judicial power that was the foundation of the historical doc-
trine. Stoll, Treinies, and Chicot indicate that if the proceedings in
the original action comported with minimal due process-the right
to a hearing, upon fair notice, before an impartial tribunal-then most
questions of judicial power become less important than preserving the
finality of judgments. Nevertheless, in Kalb and Fidelity the Court
held that there are some issues that simply are more important than
finality. Those two cases, moreover, cannot be viewed as aberrations,
for they were unanimous decisions by essentially the same Court that
unanimously decided Stoll, Treinies, and Chicot.72 Indeed, Kalb and
Chicot were handed down on the same day. The five cases must be
viewed as somehow consistent in the Court's mind.
The first major attempt to rationalize these cases was the Restate-
ment of Judgments,73 which appeared two years after Fidelity. The
Restatement holds that the judgment of a court having jurisdiction
over the parties to an action should generally not be vulnerable to
attack for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.74 But the Restatement
would permit attacks if "the policy underlying the doctrine of res
judicata is outweighed by the policy against permitting the court to
act beyond its jurisdiction. ' 75 This formulation has been criticized, 70
72. The Stoll Court consisted of Chief Justice Hughes and Justices McReynolds,
Brandeis, Butler, Stone, Roberts, Black, and Reed, with one seat vacant. By the time
Fidelity was decided, 16 months after Stoll, Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, and Murphy
had come on the Court, replacing Justices Brandeis and Butler and filling the vacant
seat. Stoll, Treinies, and Fidelity were written by Justice Reed, Kalb by Justice Black,
and Chicot by Chief Justice Hughes. Justice Butler did not take part in deciding
Treinies; Justice McReynolds did not take part in Fidelity and concurred without
opinion in Stoll.
73. FiasT RESTATEMENT § 10. See also id. §§ 4-8 (requisites of valid judgment).
74. Section 9 of the Restatement codifies the rule of Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling
Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931), concerning personal jurisdiction:
Where a defendant appears in an action to object that the court has no jurisdiction
over him and the court overrules the objection and judgment is rendered against
him, the parties are precluded from collaterally attacking the judgment on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the defendant.
75. Id. § 10(1). Section 10(2) mentions fi~c factors "appropriate to be considered in
determining that collateral attack should be permitted":
a) the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was clear;
b) the determination as to jurisdiction depended upon a question of law rather
than of fact;
c) the court was one of limited and not of general jurisdiction;
d) the question of jurisdiction was not actually litigated;
e) the policy against the court's acting beyond its jurisdiction is strong.
Section 10 has been characterized as "a correct statement of the law as the Supreme
Court has developed it." Duke v. Durfee, 308 F.2d 209, 217-18 (8th Cir. 1962) (Blackmun,
J.), rev'd, 375 U.S. 106 (1963). The Supreme Court disagreed with the weight Judge
Blackmun assigned to the policies at stake, but it did not disagree with the balancing
test itself. See p. 179 & note 77 infra.
76. See lB MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcricE lf 0.405[4], at 648-49 & nAl (2d ed. 1974);
Green, Res Judicata and Its Applicability to Judgments, 28 MINN. L. REV. 77 (1944).
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but the Supreme Court has indicated its approval of the balancing
test.
77
The most recent scholarly attempt at synthesis,78 as well as the most
comprehensive, is the work of Professor Dobbs. In a series of four
articles in the mid-1960s, 7 9 Dobbs developed an elaborate analysis of
the "bootstrap principle," the process by which otherwise void judg-
Professor Moore takes a position similar to the one taken in this Note by arguing that
a policy "which treats a judicial determination as waste paper [can seldom] outweigh
society's interest in having the determination of its courts respected, especially when
they are courts of competent jurisdiction." lB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE f 0.405[4],
at 649 (2d ed. 1974). But his attack on'the Restatement is flawed by his assertion that
public policy does have a role to play in res judicata determinations, id. at 650.
Compare id. and id. 11 0.405[11], at 786 with FIRST RESTATEMENT § 10, comment b, at
62. See also Dobbs, The Validation of Void Judgments: The Bootstrap Principle (pt. 2),
53 VA. L. REV. 1241, 1246-47, 1249-50 (1967) (criticizing Moore's analysis of Kalb and
Fidelity).
77. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 114 n.12 (1963) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 451(2) (Supp. 1948), which is identical to § 10 of the Restatement of
Judgments).
Durfee is the most recent Supreme Court decision in this area, and it appears to
put to rest any doubts as to whether state courts may attack each other's judgments on
traditional territorial sovereignty/subject-matter jurisdiction grounds. See Currie, Full
Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 89,
103-09. At issue was title to a tract of land that had once been an island in the Missouri
River, whose path formed the boundary between the states of Nebraska and Missouri.
Durfee claimed under a Nebraska sheriff's deed and Duke under a Missouri swamp land
patent; the only question was whether the land was in Missouri or Nebraska. That
question turned on the nature of a shift in the river's course; it was litigated in the
Nebraska courts in a quiet-title action brought by Durfee, and the Nebraska Supreme
Court eventually found that the land was in Nebraska. Durfee v. Keiffer, 168 Neb.
272, 95 N.W.2d 618 (1959). When Duke then sued in Missouri to quiet title, Durfee re-
moved to federal district court on diversity grounds and pleaded the Nebraska decree as
a bar. The district court disagreed with the Nebraska court's assessment of the shift in
the river's course. But it agreed with Durfee that the issue was precluded by the
Nebraska judgment and therefore dismissed the action. The Eighth Circuit, in reversing,
applied the Restatement's balancing test, see note 75 supra, and held that Missouri's
interest in controlling land within its borders overrode preclusion policies. Duke v. Durfee,
308 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962) (opinion of Blackmun, J.), rev'd, 375 U.S. 106 (1963). In
unanimously reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that Duke had had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the jurisdictional question in the Nebraska action
and thus could not raise that question to attack the Nebraska judgment. 375 U.S. at 111.
78. For others, and for discussions of related matters, see Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS
OF EQuiT 296-380 (1950) (decrees of courts vested with general equity powers should
not be subject to attack for "want of equity jurisdiction"); Boskey & Braucher, supra
note 58; Cox, The Void Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. CHt. L. REV. 86, 110-11
(1948) (subject-matter jurisdiction of court entering interlocutory order inappropriate
criterion for determining whether violation of order punishable by contempt); Currie,
supra note 77; Gavit, Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter and Res Judicata, 80 U. PA. L.
REV. 386 (1932) (court without jurisdiction should be treated as common law arbitrator
and its judgments as awards); Note, supra note 58. See also note 76 supra (citing sources).
79. Consent, supra note 5; Dobbs, Trial Court Error as an Excess of Jurisdiction, 43
TEx. L. REv. 854 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Error); Dobbs, The Validation of Void
Judgments: The Bootstrap Principle (pts. 1 & 2), 53 VA. L. REV. 1003, 1241 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Bootstrap]; Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as Beyond Bootstrap].
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ments are "validated."80 He proposed a two-step inquiry: first, wheth-
er the will of the sovereign, as expressed in constitutional provisions
and legislative enactments, supports application of bootstrap to the
judgment under consideration; then, whether bootstrap, though per-
missible, should for reasons of public policy not be applied.81 His
first step is in a sense quite classical, for it focuses directly on the
power of the rendering court. It is not immediately concerned, how-
ever, with that court's power vel non over the particular case before
it, but rather with its power to determine whether it had such power
-its jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction. The existence of this
power is to be determined a priori, without regard to the conduct of
the litigants in the original action, since Dobbs's courts are creatures
of the will of their creating sovereign: "A court does not have power
to determine its own jurisdiction merely because the Supreme Court
wishes it to be so; it has that power only if the legislature or con-
stitution 'wishes' it to be so. ' '82 The similarities among this approach,
the pre-Stoll careful parsing of jurisdictional statutes,8 3 and analyses
of strictly jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional issues84 are striking;
the contrast with the broad finality language of Stoll, Treinies, and
Chicots5 equally so. Nevertheless, the approach does not conflict with
the holdings of the Stoll cases.86 Equally important, the approach does
handle Kalb perfectly, as that case turned on a perceived congres-
sional denial of all power to the state courts once a Frazier-Lemke
80. Bootstrap (pt. 1), supra note 79, at 1005-06.
81. Id. (pt. 2) at 1247.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Elliott v. Lessee of Peirsol, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 328, 338-41 (1828); Town of
Pelham v. The Schooner B.F. Woolsey, 3 F. 457 (S.D.N.Y.), ajf'd sub nom. Terrell v.
The Schooner B.F. Woolsey, 4 F. 552 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880); Gunn v. Howell, 27 Ala. 663
(1855). Cf. pp. 165-66 & notes 5-8 supra (discussion of English cases).
84. E.g., Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1893); see pp. 169-
70 supra.
85. See pp. 174-75 & notes 55-57 supra.
86. Stoll, Treinies, and Chicot all rested on the general jurisdiction of the rendering
court and its consequent authority to determine the extent of its jurisdiction. Chicot
County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1940) (authority to
determine jurisdiction); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 75-76 (1939); Stoll v.
Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72 & n.14 (1938). Dobbs, however, apparently does not agree
with the Court on the significance of whether the jurisdictional issue was litigated in the
original proceeding. He regards the question of prior actual litigation of jurisdiction as
relevant only to "a judicially formulated policy of res judicata." Bootstrap (pt. 2), supma
note 79, at 1253. By contrast, the Stoll Court distinguished a prior case involving a clear
congressional denial of bankruptcy jurisdiction over insurance companies on the ground
that the earlier case did not involve "an actually contested issue and order as to
jurisdiction." 305 U.S. at 175-76 (distinguishing Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920)). Moreover, in Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 114 n.12 (1963),
the Court suggested that Kalb and Fidelity might now be decided differently if the
jurisdictional issues were to have been litigated in the prior actions.
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petition was filed. 87 The approach does less well with Fidelity, how-
ever, as Dobbs recognizes.88 But his theory has a second step, and he
views Fidelity as an example of the occasional subordination of res
judicata principles to more compelling policy considerations:
There was no real lack of jurisdiction involved at all; the court
in question had jurisdiction to decide the merits. It should have
decided the merits differently, however, and its erroneous decision
so seriously affected public interests that it would be impolitic to
give that judgment the normal res judicata effect. In this view
bootstrap is not involved at all, nor even jurisdiction; all that is
involved is a decision not to apply the normal rules of res judicata
to the decision on the merits. Although the policy of sovereign
immunity may have been overplayed by the Court, it is at least
rational to say that the public treasury should not be raided by
res judicata.89
The voidness doctrine was born in the struggles over judicial power
in England and came of age in the accommodations to federal coex-
istence among the national and state judiciaries in the United States
in the last century. With the growing emphasis on finality in this
century, it has entered its dotage; it is now apparently confined to
occasional forays in the name of public policy. The impact of emergent
finality policies on the doctrine has been noted, but the development
of a coherent doctrine from those policies-begun in Stoll, Treinies,
and Chicot-was forestalled by Kalb and Fidelity. Throughout, how-
ever, the rationale of the voidness doctrine itself has remained re-
markably constant: questions of jurisdiction may be found to have
been conclusively determined 0 or parties may be estopped to raise
them,91 but those questions are nevertheless thought to be material
when judgments come under attack. The jurisdiction of a court ren-
dering a judgment is still seen as the index of its power to have done so.
87. 308 U.S. at 440. That Dobbs's approach accounts so well for Kalb is hardly sur-
prising. One of his major criticisms of both the Restatement and Moore is that they
do not deal adequately with Kalb, and the legislative intent test was clearly constructed
with Kalb in mind. See Bootstrap (pt. 2), supra note 79, at 1249-54.
88. See Bootstrap (pts. I & 2), supra note 79, at 1013, 1258-59.
89. Id. (pt. 2) at 1258-59.
90. E.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
91. E.g., In re Griffin, 67 Cal. 2d 343, 347-49, 431 P.2d 625, 628-29, 62 Cal. Rptr. 1,
4-5 (1967) (Traynor, C.J.) (estoppel to attack jurisdiction of court revoking petitioner's
probation, where petitioner's acts led to ouster of jurisdiction). See generally IB MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACrICE ff 0.405[11 (2d ed. 1965).
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II. Judicial Power and the Voidness Doctrine:
A Theoretical Framework
Because of the continuing relationship between power and voidness,
one's view of the voidness doctrine will be shaped by one's concept of
the nature of judicial power. Many analyses, and especially that of
Dobbs, equate jurisdiction with judicial power and thereby proceed
from faulty premises. By focusing narrowly on the specific court in-
volved in the prior proceeding, they ignore the broader question of
the role of courts in general-of the judicial system-in our society.
This Part examines that role in relation to the foundations of judi-
cial power and as reflected in the structure of the American judicial
system. The inquiry proceeds in two stages: the first into the powers
of the judicial system as an entity and the way these powers are vested
in courts, and the second into the meaning of allocations of jurisdic-
tion among the various tribunals of the system. It will be seen that the
only legitimate criterion for validity of a judgment is whether the
proceedings leading to its entry comported with due process. 92 There
should be no such thing as a judgmeiit void for want of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
A. The Origins of Judicial Power
A society cannot function without a mechanism for the settlement
of disputes. 93 Moreover, as a verbal proposition, the power to "re-
92. For terminological convenience, although not without some conceptual justification,
"due process" for the purposes of this Note will include all aspects of the question
whether the rendering court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Personal juris-
diction generally has three parts, and only the first two are usually thought of in due
process terms. These parts are (1) actual notice to defendant, where he can reasonably
be identified, see p. 172 & note 46 supra; (2) "sufficient contacts" between the defendant
and the forum to justify exercise of judicial power ("Iongarm" jurisdiction), see pp. 172-
73 & note 47 supra; (3) statutory authorization, (enumerating the bases consistent with
the first two aspects upon which the court may exercise jurisdiction), e.g., CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) ("any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of
this state or of the United States"); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 302 (McKinney 1972 &
Supp. 1976) (enumerating bases). See generally D. LoUISELL & G. HAZARD, supra note 1.
at 302-04. All three aspects are subject to waiver. See York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890)
(constitutionally permissible for state to treat appearance to contest jurisdiction as volun-
tary submission to jurisdiction).
A party who did not appear in the original action must be allowed in a subsequent
action to contest the original court's power to bind him to judgment, but whether due
process requires that he be allowed to contest statutory jurisdiction or only constitutional
jurisdiction is not absolutely clear. It would seem logical, however, that the notice ele-
ment of due process would forbid precluding a party who correctly concluded that the
court did not have statutory jurisdiction over him.
93. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 55-56 (1964). Legal theorists of widely divergent
views have recognized that all but the most primitive societies need-or, at least, seem
always to have-a mechanism for the resolution of disputes. E.g., G. GILMORE, THE ACES
OF AMERICAN LAw 1 (1977); H.L.A. HART, THE CONcEpr OF LAw 89-91 (1961); K.
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solve" or "settle" entails finality for the resolution or settlement. As
H.L.A. Hart has observed, "Disputes as to whether an admitted rule
has or has not been violated will always occur and will .. .continue
interminably, if there is no agency specially empowered to ascertain
finally, and authoritatively, the fact of violation."9 4 In our society the
judicial system exists to resolve disputes. "Courts to determine the
rights of parties are an integral part of our system of government." 95
Indeed, the lack of a workable mechanism for resolving disputes
among the states was regarded as a principal flaw of the Articles of
Confederation, and the creation of a national judiciary was one of
the first orders of business of the Constitutional Convention. 96
Judgmental finality, then, is central to judicial power: if simply
ending disputes were not a desirable social goal, there would have
been no reason to establish courts to accomplish precisely that pur-
pose. But finality cannot be the sole determinant of judicial power,
for finality and "justice" are in constant tension as social goals. The
assignment of dispute resolution to the judiciary can be viewed as
indicative of a societal recognition that the judicial process will gen-
erally produce the correct result.97 To end disputes without a rea-
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (3d ed. 1960); L. POSPISIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW
37 (1971); cf. id. at 8-9 (noting transition to "law" from "feud" when authority exists
"who either has enough power to enforce his will or possesses the skill to persuade the
quarreling parties to accept his solutions"). Llewellyn came to repent of his statement
that what officials do about disputes is "the law itself," K. LLEWELLYN, supra at 12 (em-
phasis omitted). See id. at 8-9. But nowhere in his qualification did he recant his prior
assertion that "[t]his doing of something about disputes, this doing of it reasonably, is the
business of law," id. at 12.
94. H.L.A. HART, supra note 93, at 91.
95. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938).
96. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. ,VECHSLER, HART 9& AVECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 4-6 & nn.17-19 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited
without cross-reference as HART & WECHSLER]. The Framers did not disagree among
themselves concerning the need for courts, only concerning the need for federal trial
courts. Id. at 11-12.
97. See, e.g., Summers, Law, Adjudicative Processes, and Civil Justice, in LAW, REASON,
AND JUSTICE 169 (G. Hughes ed. 1969). The judicial process-determination by an im-
partial tribunal, based upon evidence subject to adversary examination and aided by
arguments of the parties-is not confined to courts, but it is an attribute of them.
See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 544-47, 549-52, 581-83 (1962) (plurality opinion
by Harlan, J.); Golding, Preliminaries to the Study of Procedural Justice, in LAW, REASON,
AND JUSTICE 71 (G. Hughes ed. 1969) (concept of "jural-like" dispute settlement, charac-
terized by persuasive conflict before neutral third party, appears in variety of contexts).
For discussions of various social decision procedures and their aims, see B. BARRY, PO-
LITICAL ARGUMENT 84-93 (1965), and LaTour, Houlden, Walker, & Thibaut, Procedure:
Transnational Perspectives and Preferences, 86 YALE L.J. 258 (1976). The parallel ex-
pansion during this century's procedural revolution, see pp. 171-73 supra, of the em-
phasis placed on fairness-based procedure and of the scope of res judicata doctrine
suggests that the societal willingness to accede to demands for finality is related to
the strength of the societal belief that the judicial system produces just resolutions
of disputes.
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sonable assurance that the ends achieved will be perceived as "just"
would risk undermining this support for the judicial system. But as
Hart has also observed:
It is plain that the advantages of quick and final settlement of
disputes ... are purchased at a price .... The scorer [that is, de-
cisionmaker] may make honest mistakes, be drunk or may wan-
tonly violate his duty to apply the scoring rule to the best of his
ability .... Provision may be made for correcting his rulings by
appeal to a higher authority: but this must end somewhere in a
final, authoritative judgment, which will be made by fallible hu-
man beings and so will carry with it the same risk of honest mis-
take, abuse, or violation. It is impossible to provide by rule for
the correction of the breach of every rule.98
The resolution of this tension between the desires for finality and
justice in dispute resolution is precisely the object of the familiar
doctrine of res judicata/preclusion. 99 This doctrine stands on three
bases, which can be broadly characterized as economic, institutional,
and philosophical. The economic basis is the embodiment of the so-
cial need to put disputes to rest. 10 It includes the policy against vexa-
tious litigation'' and is a recognition of the large costs associated with
litigation. These costs include attorneys' fees as the most obvious com-
ponent, but also include expenses such as discovery and transcript costs,
litigants' time, expert witnesses' fees, and so forth.102 Moreover, there
98. H.L.A. HART, supra note 93, at 139.
99. "Preclusion" was first used in a systematic way to refer to the law of judgments
by Professor Allen Vestal, who noted that the commentators seemed unhappy with the
classical terminology in the field. Vestal, The Constitution and PreclusionfRes Judicata,
62 MICH. L. REy. 33, 33 & n.5 (1963). He suggested that the word was evocative of the
central concern of determining the effect of a judgment in foreclosing subsequent liti-
gation. Id. at 33 n.6. He has conducted extensive inquiries into the law of judgments,
and his terminology is now fairly standard. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS §§ 68, 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference
as SECOND RESTATEMENT]; D. LouISELL & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 636-37; Expansion,
supra note 39, at 359 n.7 (1974) (citing cases). For general discussions of the policies
behind res judicata/preclusion, see, e.g., FIRST RESTATEMENT § 1, comment a; Cleary,
Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 344-49 (1948); Developments in the Law:
Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 820 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
100. See, e.g., Schmieder v. Hall, 545 F.2d 768, 771 (2d Cir. 1976).
101. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 342-48 (1971). But cf. Cleary, supra note 99, at 346-48 (policy against vexatious
litigation may exact severe penalty for procedural failure).
102. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 334-38 (1971) (costs of patent litigation); cf. Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical
Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 856 n.221 (1977) (collateral estoppel
provisions of Clayton Act enacted largely to reduce costs of private antitrust suits);
Note, Contingent Fees for Expert Witnesses in Civil Litigation, 86 YALE L.J. 1680
(1977) (proposing contingent fees for expert witnesses to remove what "may be the
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are frequently strong reliance interests in judgments which need pro-
tection: for example, persons divorced may remarry10 3 or financial
plans may be based upon the receipt of damages. 0 4 Even though re-
litigation may in some cases produce benefits, those benefits are thought
insufficient to compensate for the cost of the totality of extra litiga-
tion.105
The institutional basis reflects the interest of courts in preserving
the integrity of the judicial system as a whole. This aspect of the in-
terest in the finality of judgments is a matter of self-preservation: be-
litigant's largest out-of-pocket expense"). Discovery costs illustrate the strong influence
of the procedural revolution on finality policies. Liberal discovery not only improves
the truth-finding effectiveness of the litigation process, it also increases the cost of
the process. Both effects push in the direction of finality, since relitigation becomes not
only less necessary but also more expensive.
103. Divorce has been a particularly difficult problem in the law of judgments,
since varying and jealously held attitudes toward the sanctity of marriage, embodied
in state divorce legislation, collide directly with the full faith and credit clause, U.S.
CONsT. art. IV, § 1. See D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons,
Rosenstiel and Borax, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 26, 26 (1966). The problem is not a new
one-Justice Story's conflicts treatise discussed the problems caused by the sharply dif-
ferent divorce law of England and Scotland. J. STORY, COM NTARIES ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 168-92 (1834). Moreover, despite the recent liberalization of many state divorce
laws, see, e.g., 1966 N.Y. Laws, ch. 254 (codified as amended primarily at N.Y. Dof.
REt. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1977)) (grounds for divorce to include cruel and inhuman
treatment, abandonment, prison confinement, and separation, as well as former exclusive
ground of adultery), variations still exist, and the recent decision in Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393, 404-10 (1975), upholding state residency requirements for divorce jurisdiction,
suggests that the problems have not been entirely eliminated.
The Court has held that Stoll and Chicot principles apply to questions of divorce
jurisdiction, Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 351-53 (1948), but state-court adherence
to this rule has not been entirely wholehearted. See, e.g., Farley v. Farley, 227 Cal. App.
2d 1, 38 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1964) (portion of Utah divorce decree held void despite active
participation by attacking party in prior action). For an excellent survey of questions
of choice of law, jurisdiction, and recognition of judgments in divorce proceedings, see
R. CR.,,NTON, D. CURRIE & H. KA.Y, CONFuCT OF LAWs 752-848 (2d ed. 1975).
104. See, e.g., Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374
(1940) (reliance interest in settlement of estate of Drainage District reorganized under as-
sertedly unconstitutional statute).
105. Presumably the attacking party perceives a positive net return for the attack,
but there are otlser costs to consider: (a) the cost to the courts themselves, in terms
of judicial and administrative time and expense, but see Cleary, supra note 99, at 348-49
(courts exist for purpose of trying lawsuits; court costs minor governmental expense);
(b) the costs to the originally successful litigant, who may have been "wrong" in some
msetaph)sical sense, but see p. 187 and notes 117 & 118 infra, but even so should not
be required to pay twice for defending himself, or indeed to pay again to retain an
award already diminished by the cost of obtaining it. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 338 (1971).
Economic considerations are not always dispositive, of course. Due process-the notion
of "fundamental fairness"--is properly viewed as non-cost-accountable, and relitigation
must be allowed if the proceedings in the original action did not comport with due
process. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965). Moreover, cost and other
finality factors are thought to have diminished significance when the judgment under
attack is one of conviction of a crime. See note 131 infra.
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ing "possessed of neither the purse nor the sword,"' 06 the system must
depend on respect-on its "moral sanction"107-to maintain its
powers.' 08 The judicial system cannot expect respect from society at
large unless its member courts respect each other. The Framers of the
Constitution, keenly aware of the judicial disorder under the Articles
of Confederation,' 0 9 gave explicit recognition to this interest in the
full faith and credit clause," 0 which requires courts of different
states"' to treat each other with respect-with "not some, but full
[faith and] credit.""12 Respect by federal courts for state court processes
has come to be seen as an integral part of our federal system: it is the
essence of "Our Federalism," the principles of comity and federalism
of Younger v. Harris1 3 and its progeny."
4
106. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frank-
furter echoed Hamilton. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) 521, 523 (J. Cooke
ed. 1961).
107. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
108. The federal courts have sought to maintain their independence and moral sanc-
tion by refusing to adjudicate when the result would not be final. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 409 (1792). See HART & WECHSLER 91-93; A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 117 (1962).
Some states have explicit constitutional provisions permitting advisory opinions by
their Supreme Court, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. i1, art. II. For a discussion of the
impact of such provisions on the prestige of the courts rendering them, see HART &
WECHSLER 69-70.
109. See THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton) 135, 143-44 (J. Cooke ed. 1961); HART
& WECHSLER 4-6 & nn.17-19.
110. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
111. The constitutional provision mentions only states, but Congress early extended
the notion of full faith and credit to include the federal courts, and the extension
has remained in effect since 1790. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970)); see Degnan, supra note 39, at 743-44 & n.15.
The squabbling that results when full faith and credit is not taken seriously is well
illustrated by Porter v. Porter, 101 Ariz. 131, 416 P.2d 564 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
957 (1967), and Porter v. Wilson, 419 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1020 (1970). See generally Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The
Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 798 (1969).
112. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938). See also Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343,
354-55 (1948) ("Nor do we understand the decisions of this Court to support the propo-
sition that the obligation . . . amounts to something less than the duty to accord full
faith and credit to decrees of divorce entered by courts of sister States.") (footnote
omitted; emphasis in original).
113. 401 U.S. 37, 44-45, 52-54 (1971) (federal courts may not stay or enjoin pending
state criminal proceedings except under special circumstances).
114. Cf. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 146 (1971) (purpose of Anti-Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), to "avoid unseemly conflict between the state and the
federal courts").
Post-Younger cases have enlarged the category of state proceedings protected from
federal court interference. E.g., Juidice v. Vail, 97 S. Ct. 1211 (1977) (supplemental pro-
ceedings by judgment creditors); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) ("quasi-
criminal" action); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-502 (1974) (bond, sentencing,
and jury-fee practices of state magistrate and judge).
Underlying the Younger cases is the conviction that state courts are competent to
decide federal questions when called upon to do so. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
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The philosophical basis of preclusion theory is a recognition that
human beings have not been granted awareness of ultimate truth. The
judicial system is designed to arrive at answers by a certain process,
and there is no meaningful way it can check the correctness of those
answers by the same process. As the Court held in Stoll, "[a]fter a
party has his day in court, with opportunity to present his evidence
and his view of the law, a collateral attack upon the decision . . .
merely retries the issue previously determined. There is no reason
to expect that the second decision will be more satisfactory than the
first.""'5 This conclusion highlights the distinction between what Brian
Barry has called "procedural fairness" and "background fairness";
that is, between adherence to the rules of a truth-determination pro-
cedure and satisfaction with the result.",' The philosophical basis rec-
ognizes that an opinion as to the correctness of a result cannot affect
the legitimacy of the result's existence." 7 Finality must be a function-
of procedural fairness, not background fairness."1
8
These bases are powerful impulses toward finality in judicial de-
cisionmaking. Although the technical doctrines of res judicata/preclu-
sion-the doctrines of "claim" and "issue" preclusion'" 9-are not abso-
493 n.35 (1976); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975). Contra, Neuborne,
The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). For recent discussions of the de-
velopment of the Younger Doctrine, see Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977);
Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019 (1977); Developments in the Law
-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1274-1330 (1977).
115. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938).
116. B. BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUNENT 102-06 (1965).
117. These considerations, of course, apply to appellate review as strongly as they do
to other forms of review. But there are legitimate reasons for providing appellate re-
view, and it is not unreasonable to think of such review as a continuation of the
process rather than a reinitiation of it. See, e.g., Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 453-54 (1963) (appellate
review provides uniformity apart from correcting errors). In seeking to extend these
considerations to non-appellate review, however, one must be mindful of Justice Jack-
son's epigram on the role of the Supreme Court: "We are not final because we are
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 540 (1953) (concurring in result). See also note 162 infra (distinguishing voidness
attacks from appellate review).
118. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 93, at 139 (quoted in part at p. 184 supra); Bator,
supra note 117, at 446-53, 455-60.
Professor Bator was dealing with criminal cases, which are outside the scope of this
Note, see note 131 infra. But his point is applicable a fortiori to civil cases. Whatever
human uncertainties make it difficult to assess the correctness of results proved "beyond
a reasonable doubt," those uncertainties can only be increased when results obtained
by satisfying a lesser burden are examined.
119. "Claim preclusion" encompasses the rules of merger and bar. The Second Re-
statement expresses the rule of merger in this way:
When a valid and final personal judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff:
(a) The plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action on the original claim or
any part thereof, but he can maintain an action upon the judgment; and
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lutes,1 20 the bases on which they stand are clearly fundamental to the
role of the judicial system as a dispute settler. Indeed, the philosophical
basis provides the only satisfactory solution to the problem of Hart's
drunken scorer: having made the a priori decision that the judicial pro-
cess is the best way to resolve disputes "fairly" or "justly," one may
thereafter inquire only whether that process has in fact been carried
out. If it has not been-i.e., if the prior proceedings did not comport
with due process-then an attack should be permitted, for the funda-
mental assumption underlying the a priori commitment of dispute reso-
lution to the judicial system will have been avoided. But once it has
been determined that due process was satisfied, further inquiry is mean-
ingless. Such an inquiry would be an attempt to ascertain the "Facts as
They Really Are,"' 2'1 an attempt that cannot succeed. Individual ques-
tions of background fairness are not material to questions of judicial
power; the judicial system meets a need-resolution of disputes-and
its power as a system is independent of the nature of any particular
dispute. The power stems directly from the existence of disputes in
general and from the recognition that the judicial process is the best
all-purpose mechanism available for their resolution.
For the system to exercise this power, however, it must provide a
(b) In an action upon the judgment, the defendant cannot avail himself of de-
fenses he might have interposed, or did interpose, in the first action.
SECOND RESTATEMENT § 47. Under the rule of bar, "[a] valid and final judgment ren-
dered in favor of the defendant bars another action by the plaintiff on the same
claim." Id. § 48. "Issue preclusion," or "collateral estoppel," is the rule that "[w]hen
an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment,
and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in
a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim."
Id. § 68.
The questions to be answered in determining whether something is to be precluded
differ sharply under the two preclusion doctrines. Claim preclusion questions are norma-
tive: how much ought to be covered by a judgment in an action of the type of the
prior action? Issue preclusion questions, by contrast, are descriptive: was the matter
sought to be precluded covered in the first action, and to what extent? Claim preclu-
sion addresses a judgment as a thing and seeks to determine the appropriate size of
the thing. Issue preclusion deals with judgments as statements that certain atomic
controversies have been resolved; the problem is to identify the controversies that were
important enough to the original litigation, and sharply enough contested therein, that
one may invoke the philosophical basis to say that furtlser examination of those con-
troversies would be meaningless. See generally F. JArs, supra note 1, at 549-84; D.
LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 618-22, 630-35; Developments, supra note 99,
at 824-50.
120. See, e.g., Henderson v. Bardahl Int'l Corp., 72 Wash. 2d 109, 119, 431 P.2d
961, 967-68 (1967) (rejecting assertion of collateral estoppel that would result in "wind-
fall" judgment: "the doctrine of res judicata ... is not to be applied so rigidly as to defeat
the ends of justice, or to work an injustice"); IB MooRE's FEDERAL PLucrcer f 0.405[11]
(2d ed. 1974); SECO.D REs-rATENENr § 48.1 (exceptions to general rule of bar); id. § 68.1
(Tent. Draft No. 3 1975) (exceptions to general rule of issue preclusion).
121. Error, supra note 79, at 867; see Bator, supra note 117, at 446-49.
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clear and unambiguous indication of when it has resolved a dispute.
If there are two "final" answers to a dispute, then neither may be
relied upon until the dispute between the answers has been resolved.1
22
The most obvious candidate to serve as the system's signal that it has
spoken with finality is, of course, the final judgment. 12 3 For the final
judgment to be effective as the system's signal it is necessary that the
judgment speak not merely for the court entering it but for the system
as a whole. Some may object, however, that one signal cannot emerge
from a system composed of fifty semi-autonomous state subsystems, all
of which exist alongside the inferior federal courts. Nevertheless, care-
ful analysis demonstrates that this nonhomogeneity is overcome by
two fundamental attributes of the system: there is "one supreme
Court" 12 4 at its head, and its components all employ essentially the
same process. 
25
Presumably, no one would disagree with the proposition that a final
judgment rendered by the United States Supreme Court is valid and
is the system's last word, 20 no matter how "wrong" it may appear.
12 7
122. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 350-51 (1816) (Story, J.).
123. For the purposes of this Note, a "final judgment" will be a judgment that is
treated by the court entering it as conclusive on the issues it comprehends, and as to
which the time for appeal to any court having appellate jurisdiction over the rendering
court has expired. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608, 611 n.22 (1975). This
is not the same definition as that of either Restatement, neither of which requires
expiration of the time for appeal. FIRST RESTATEMIENT § 41, comment d; SECOND RE-
STATEMENT § 41, comment f. See also, e.g., Local 438, Constr. Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371
U.S. 542 (1963) (meaning of "final judgment" as regards Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970)); SECOND RESTATEMENT § 41, comment b
(same). Nevertheless, the definition here is reasonable for the proposed use of the "final
judgment" as the system's signal that it has spoken "finally and authoritatively." The
Second Restatement's definition is predicated on the judgment's being "a firm and
stable one, the 'last word' of the rendering court," id., comment a; for the judgment
to be the "last word" of the system one needs to wait until such time as the system
would not be expected to speak further, i.e., until the time for appeal has expired.
124. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
125. It is not being suggested that the state and federal courts are identical in every
respect, or that Madison's argument that federal trial courts are needed to guarantee
unbiased forums in which to adjudicate federal rights is no longer valid. I M. FARRAND,
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (rev. ed. 1937) (remarks of
Madison). Nevertheless, "the judicial process," as that term is used in this Note, see note
97 supra, is shared by state as well as federal courts. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 493 n.35 (1976) (state courts competent to adjudicate constitutional rights when
called upon to do so). But cf. Neuborne, supra note 114 (arguing that Stone premise
is incorrect).
126. See, e.g., In re Potts, 166 U.S. 263, 267 (1897) (where merits of case have been
decided by Supreme Court on appeal, circuit court is without authority, absent leave of
Supreme Court, "to grant a new trial, a rehearing or a review, or to permit new
defences on the merits to be introduced by amendment of the answer").
127. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 345 (1816) (Story, J.):
From the very nature of things, the absolute right of decision, in the last resort,
must vest somewhere-wherever it may be vested it is susceptible of abuse. In all
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Subsequent views as to the correctness of the result will affect the de-
cision's value as precedent, but they cannot affect its existence as a
binding resolution of the dispute that led to its entry. Moreover, for
questions admitted to be solely of state law, the same may be said
for decisions of state courts of last resort. They, too, speak for the
system.'2 1 Finally, the question of type-whether the question being
asked is solely one of state law-is itself a federal question, to be de-
termined, if necessary, by the Federal Supreme Court. 2 9 It is indeed
true, therefore, as Hamilton asserted in The Federalist, that the na-
tional and state judiciaries are to be regarded as "parts of one
whole."' 30 A litigant who is not satisfied that the judgment entered
against him speaks for the entire system may arrive at a court whose
authority so to speak is not in doubt. If he fails to pursue that path
then, as to him, the process has run its course and the system has
spoken. Failure to take an appeal that would have been successful
is simply one of the many mistakes or errors of judgment a litigant
may make in the course of an action.'
3
1
questions of jurisdiction the inferior, or appellate court, must pronounce the final
judgment; and common sense, as well as legal reasoning, has conferred it on the
latter.
Cf. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906) (party may not disobey Supreme
Court order and thereafter defend contempt citation on ground Court was without juris-
diction; Supreme Court's jurisdiction for determination only by Court).
128. But see Tracy v. Dufrene, 240 La. 232, 121 So. 2d 843 (1960) (although prior
quiet title judgment affirmed by state supreme court, judgment nevertheless void for
want of subject-matter jurisdiction where original suit brought in wrong parish); cf.
HART & WECHSLER 264-67 (discussing Supreme Court's power to overrule state court de-
terminations of state law).
129. Some choice-of-law rules are constitutionally required. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (state law in federal diversity cases); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (Erie doctrine includes state conflicts rules); Johnson
v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 587 (1951) (under full faith and credit clause, law of ren-
dering state determines who may attack judgment). In such cases the choice of law
raises a federal question, reviewable in the Supreme Court. Id. at 585. When, how-
ever, the choice is not required, the result simply establishes the law of X concerning
the law of 1'. H.L.A. HART, supra note 93, at 116; see Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316
U.S. 481 (1942) (remanding for determination whether construction of California statute
by California court rested on state or federal law).
130. THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton) 553, 555 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See id. No.
80 (A. Hamilton) 534, 535 (independent state final jurisdiction over national causes is
"hydra in government").
131. This Note addresses finality in civil cases only. The willingness to permit a
criminal defendant to retrieve his earlier procedural errors by collaterally attacking his
conviction creates a sharp distinction between criminal and civil finality policies. This
distinction is supported by a number of basic policy considerations. There is, for example,
a difference in societal attitudes toward deprivation of liberty and deprivation of
property, a difference that was the cornerstone of Justice Brennan's opinion for the
Court in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See id. at 432. The Court held that habeas
corpus "lies to enforce the right of personal liberty." Id. at 430. Thus even in the
face of a procedural default, federal habeas "prevents the State from closing off the
convicted defendant's last opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights, thereby
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From a structural viewpoint, therefore, the availability of appel-
late review guarantees that the final judgment is an unambiguous
signal that the system has spoken. But that review is not always avail-
able. Courts of last resort may often decline review on discretionary
grounds,132 even where review is ostensibly mandatory; 133 in addition,
some judgments are not reviewable at all. 3 4 Denials of discretionary
review, however, are analytically similar to affirmance on the merits:
punishing him for his default." Id. at 432 (emphasis added). See Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 37, 40 (1972) (imposition of imprisonment where accused did not have
access to counsel infringes liberty without due process); Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397
Pa. 575, 586, 155 A.2d 825, 830 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 848 (1960) (interest in liberty
precludes imposition of imprisonment for vicarious violations of regulatory statute, but
criminal fine permissible); Pollak, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50, 65 (1956).
Moreover, the assumptions of the economic basis of preclusion theory are less per-
suasive in criminal cases. One need not fashion rules to protect the defendant's interest
in being free from repeated litigation, since that interest has constitutional stature and
is protected by the double jeopardy clause. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (Fifth
Amendment protection against double jeopardy embodies collateral estoppel as consti-
tutional requirement). The debate centers around the government's interest in finality.
See, e.g., Bator, supra note 117, at 444-62; Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral
Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CH. L. REv. 142, 146-47 (1970); Note, Collateral
and Equitable Estoppel of Federal Criminal Defendants, 29 RUTcERS L. RV. 1221, 1225-
28, 1237-46 (1976). But in such a situation, where one party's interest in finality is ab-
solutely protected and the other's is the subject of intense debate, it is clear that the
desirability of finality qua finality must be evaluated independently of the result in
civil cases, where the finality interests of the opposing parties are more nearly equal.
It may be argued that the human uncertainties inherent in attempts to determine
truth, which underlie the philosophical basis of preclusion theory, are as applicable to
criminal finality policy as to civil. See Bator, supra note 117, at 446-53. But the phil-
osophical basis relies on process as the measure of judgmental finality, see pp. 187-88
supra, and the societal interest in individual liberty has resulted in the phrase "due
process of law" carrying many more implications in criminal than in civil contexts. E.g.,
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (due process requires "proof beyond a reason-
able doubt of every fact necessary to constitute" crime charged). See generally G.
GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAiw 506-47 (9th ed. 1975). It is
therefore possible to view many habeas cases as process-oriented and not precluded by
the philosophical basis. See Bator, supra note 117, at 455-66. Indeed, the holding of
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976), that admission in a state criminal proceeding
of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot serve as a basis for
federal habeas corpus if defendant had "an opportunity for full and fair litigation of [the]
Fourth Amendment claim" in the state proceedings, appears to suggest that non-process-
oriented collateral attacks on state convictions may no longer be permitted.
It is clear from this discussion that there are different considerations governing
criminal and civil finality. Although the arguments of this Note may bear to some
extent on criminal questions, they cannot of their own weight be dispositive of them.
132. E.g., Sup. CT. R. 19 (considerations governing review on certiorari); see, e.g.,
N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW § 5602(a) (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1976) (appeal by permission to
court of appeals). See generally HART & WECHSLER 1600-29.
133. See HART & WECHSLER 648-62. But see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975)
(summary action on cases within mandatory jurisdiction of Supreme Court has same
precedential weight as action after plenary consideration).
134. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1970) (order remanding removed case to state court
"not reviewable on appeal or otherwise"). The problem of the unappealable judgment
is complex and is examined in note 201 infra.
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the court of last resort has spoken, if only to say that it did not re-
gard the case as important enough to command the court's full at-
tention. But that is very close to saying that the court is satisfied to
maintain the lower-court judgment as the resolution of the dispute
in question, that it is satisfied to have that judgment speak for the
system. In denying review the court expresses no view of the correct-
ness of the resolution, but it does, at least in civil cases,' 3 5 affirm
the existence of the resolution. A litigant who has sought Supreme
Court review and has been rebuffed may feel that the system has un-
derestimated the importance of his claim, but he cannot doubt that
the system has spoken. Indeed, there is no meaningful way that it can
speak further. Non-appellate review of judgments is an attempt to re-
initiate the process, not carry it forward, and there is "no reason to
expect that the second decision will be more satisfactory than the
first."' 3 6
B. Control of Judicial Power
Few would disagree that the need to resolve disputes "finally and
authoritatively" underlies the creation and continued existence of the
judicial system. Professor Dobbs, for example, has recognized that
"[a] judgment ought to settle a dispute, and rights and titles derived
from a judgment today ought not to be overturned twenty years from
now. No society can be stable if judicially secured rights are not se-
cure at all.' ' 137 Yet the cornerstone of Dobbs's theory of bootstrap is
that judicial power exists only to the extent that it is granted by the
legislature or constitution.13s That formulation need not conflict with
this Note's position that judicial power derives from our society's com-
mitment to the judicial process as the fundamental dispute-settling
mechanism, for "our society" is shaped and controlled by the federal
and state constitutions. Nevertheless, there is a conflict, and it is a
fundamental one. Dobbs, after stating his premise, does not there-
after distinguish between legislative and constitutional grants of power.
This Note argues that because the judicial system derives its power
from its role as the agreed-upon institutional mechanism for perform-
ing the crucial function of dispute resolution, and because that agree-
ment is reflected in federal and state constitutions, there are consti-
tutional restrictions on the power of legislatures to affect the finality
of judgments. These restrictions sharply limit the extent to which
135. See note 131 supra.
136. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938). See pp. 187-88 supra.
137. Bootstrap (pt. 1), supra note 79, at 1003 (footnote omitted).
138. Id. (pt. 2) at 1247.
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legislatures may impose the voidness doctrine on the judicial system.
The restrictions appear in different forms depending upon whether
the legislative action is that of Congress addressing federal courts,
that of Congress addressing state courts, or that of a state legislature
addressing the courts of its state.
It is, of course, not new doctrine that there are limitations on
congressional control over the federal courts. It follows from the sepa-
ration of powers 39 and from the nature of an independent judiciary
that if the judiciary undertakes to decide a case and renders judg-
ment,140 then its decision must be final as against legislative or ex-
ecutive revision. 14' The entire history of constitutional jurisprudence
139. The separation need not be regarded as complete or exclusive in order to
maintain that there are areas that are entirely legislative (e.g., appropriations), entirely
executive (e.g., negotiating treaties) or entirely judicial (e.g., trying crimes). See L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTLTIVE ACTION 28-31 (1965).
140. This Note is concerned primarily with judgments, since they are the judicial
svntem's signal of finality, see pp. 188-92 supra. During the pendency of EX parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), Congress withdrew from the Supreme Court its
appellate jurisdiction over a certain class of habeas corpus cases, a class that included
McCardle. The Court acquiesced and dismissed the appeal, but it is important to note
that final judgment had not been rendered. Of course, there was a final judgment in
the court below, but since the statute withdrew appellate jurisdiction, the crucial point
would have been the issuance of a mandate by the appellate court, in this case the
Supreme Court. See note 123 supra. McCardle has been questioned in modern times, see
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605 n.11 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Hart,
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1364-65 & n.14 (1953), reprinted with revised footnotes
in HART & WECnSLER 330, 330-31 & n.1 [hereinafter cited as Dialogue, to HART &
WECUSLER page number only], but it has never been overruled. The lack of a final
Supreme Court mandate at the time the Court dismissed the appeal places the case
outside the scope of this Note, if not by very much.
141. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (executive revision). See Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 n.86 (1969) (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1,
24 (1892)) ("inadmissible" to suggest that action might be taken contrary to judicial
determination); HART & WECHSLER 91-93; THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton) 541,
545 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("A legislature without exceeding its province cannot reverse a
determination once made, in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for
future cases.") But cf. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 395-96, 398 (1798) (seriatim
opinions of Paterson & Iredell, JJ.) (no federal bar to Connecticut legislature's exercising
judicial power to grant new trial in probate case).
Judicial revision is a more complex question than executive or legislative revision.
Courts are frequently called upon to interpret prior judgments in new litigation, and
any denial of full preclusive effect to the prior judgment is in some sense a revision
of it. It is possible, however, to distinguish between judgments that are a priori subject
to being ignored and those which must be contended with when they are raised in
subsequent litigation. Compare Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S.
693, 698-99 (1927) (patent proceedings under statute explicitly denying them any pre-
clusive effect in subsequent litigation not "judicial" within meaning of Article III)
with Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 577 (1926) (naturalization proceedings "ju-
dicial" although decree subject to subsequent suit for cancellation, since, inter alia, judg-
ment "is . .. complete evidence of its own validity unless set aside. . .. It may not
be collaterally attacked.") See generally HART & WECHSLER 95-97 (discussion of problems
raised by Tutun). To say that a judgment is void is to say precisely that it is subject
to being ignored.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 164, 1977
finds its source in the statement that "[i]t is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. ' 14 2
Moreover, Professor Henry Hart, in his celebrated Dialogue,143 pre-
sented a compelling argument that all jurisdictional statutes are sub-
ject to the inherent limitation that there must be some judicial avenue
open for the vindication of constitutional rights. Congress may not,
by its power to control jurisdiction, do what it could not do directly;
the power over jurisdiction is subject, as are all other powers of Con-
gress, to the affirmative limitations of the Constitution . 44
The foregoing restrictions limit congressional power to implement
the voidness doctrine as applied to federal judgments. The Supreme
Court is vested with judicial power directly under Article III; Con-
gress may make the Court's original jurisdiction concurrent with other
courts, 4 5 but it may not contract it.'4 6 When it comes to lower federal
courts, it is the prerogative of Congress to vest judicial power or not
to do so, 147 but a decision to vest carries certain implications. 48 In
particular, though the district courts do not exercise the entire "ju-
142. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
143. Dialogue, supra note 140.
144. Id. at 360.
145. Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 464 (1884) (dictum); Bi3rs v. Preston, III U.S.
252 (1884) (dictum); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), 1351 (1970).
146. See HART & VECHSLER 242.
147. HART 9& WECHSLER 11-12 8: nA6. For a development of the relationship between
Congress's power to create tribunals and the strictures of Article III, see the materials
collected in id. at 375-418.
148. It may not be clear what the result would be if Congress were, for example,
to create only patent courts. Cf. note 201 infra (effect of sharp limitation of jurisdiction
on court's ability to exercise judicial power). But Congress has not done that; the grant
of general federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), even with an amount
in controversy requirement, id., must signify Congress's intent to maintain the judicial
power of the district courts. See Dialogue, supra note 140, at 348-56 (§ 1331 and prede-
cessors give federal courts broad powers to supervise operation of federal law in face
of attempted withdrawals of jurisdiction); cf. note 189 inIra (discussion of power of
federal courts in some cases to proceed with actions despite acknowledged lack of juris-
diction). The power of federal courts to retain pendent claims after dismissal of the
claim that was the basis of federal jurisdiction, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 725 (1966), is another indication of the federal courts' broad authority to deal
with disputes brought before them. But see Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (in
suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970), defendants may not be joined solely to pendent
claims without independent basis for (federal) jurisdiction). The ancillary jurisdiction
of the federal courts in diversity cases also developed from the need to permit federal
courts flexibility to act as courts. See Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460
(1860). See generally HART 9- WECHSLER 921-26, 1075-81.
Amount-in-controversy limitations on district court jurisdiction do not affect the vesting
of judicial power. They are clearly designed to save the district courts for "important"
matters, and it would be incongruous to construe them as a denigration of the district
courts' authority to act as courts. See In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 220-21 (1888) (dictum)
(error as to amount in controversy does not render decree void).
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dicial Power of the United States," 149 they do exercise enough of it
so that their judgments cannot be attacked without attacking the
power itself.'; 0 This is the meaning of Des Moines: If the interest of
finality is great enough so that an excess of constitutional jurisdiction
(i.e., lack of diversity) is not sufficient to defeat it,'5' then the "ju-
dicial Power of the United States" must have some inherent content,
over and above the sum of the nine enumerated bases of federal juris-
diction.152 This residuum of power is the systemic power discussed in
149. For example, when jurisdiction is founded solely on diversity of citizenship, the
district courts may not hear claims with an amount in controversy of less than $10,000.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
150. The relation between judgmental finality and Article III judicial power was
central to tile decision in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (plurality opinion
of Harlan, J., joined by Brennan & Stewart, JJ.), to give effect to congressional declara-
tions that the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are
"established under article III of the Constitution," 28 U.S.C. §§ 171, 211 (1970). Justice
Harlan framed the test for establishment under Article III as whether the business of
the tribunal under consideration is Article III business and whether "its judges and
judgments are allowed the independence there expressly or impliedly made requisite."
370 U.S. at 552 (plurality opinion). There was in fact majority support for this test.
See id. at 586 (Clark, J., joined by Warren, C.J., concurring in result).
151. Since the Des Moines Court appeared merely to address the requirements of
the removal statute facing it (Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558), see 123 U.S.
at 556-59, the statement that Des Moines was a constitutional case requires further ex-
position. There is no doubt that the statute required diversity between each plaintiff
and each defendant. Hancock v. Holbrook, 119 U.S. 586 (1887). See also HART & WECHSLER
1064 (discussion of complete diversity requirement under other statutes). It was, how-
ever, an open question until 1967 whether this requirement was constitutionally based.
See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (interpleader ac-
tions under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970) require only minimal diversity, i.e., any two op-
posing claimants having diverse citizenship). Had the Des Moines Court been concerned
with the constitutional/statutory problem, it presumably would have considered whether
the statute conferred the full constitutional jurisdiction. But the Court sidestepped that
issue, compare Hancock v. Holbrook, 119 U.S. 586, 587 (1887) (Waite, C.J.) (suit "can-
not be removed") with Des Moines Navigation & R.R. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U.S.
552, 556-57 (1887) (Waite, C.J.) (characterizing Hancock as holding "not error" to re-
mand), and instead framed the issue before it as "whether, if all the parties were ac-
tually before the Circuit Court, the decree of [the Supreme Court] on appeal is ab-
solutely void." 123 U.S. at 557. The irrelevance of the distinction to the holding in
Des Moines was confirmed by the decision in Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U.S. 327, 340
(1894), that the absence of a federal question as a matter of law was not sufficient
grounds to attack a judgment. But see Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 175 (1938) (Des
Moines and Dowell may have rested on existence of "color of jurisdiction" in rendering
court).
152. Dobbs also regards Des Moines as fundamental. He views it as the first example
of the "bootstrap principle" in operation, the first enunciation of the concept of
"jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction." Bootstrap (pt. 1), supra note 79, at 1005-06. But
there is a significant difference between the definition of judicial power of this Note
and the first step of bootstrap. Semantically at least, jurisdiction to determine juris-
diction is still a form of jurisdiction, and hence can be controlled by anyone with
control over jurisdiction. In particular, since Congress can to a limited extent control
the jurisdiction of state courts, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1970) (district court jurisdiction
of bankruptcy matters "exclusive of the courts of the States"), it can, under bootstrap,
control jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction to the same extent. That was effectively
the Court's reasoning in Kalb, and it is the explicit basis for the first step of bootstrap.
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the previous section, as vested in the system's component courts.
*With respect to state legislatures speaking to state courts, it is clear
that the preceding argument carries over to the extent that the state
constitution provides for separation of powers.153  Moreover, every
state has created at least one court (or, if law and equity are separately
maintained, a pair of courts) with the general power to hear, with
specific, limited exceptions, every claim cognizable in the courts of
that state.'5 4 As was the case with respect to federal courts, such a
See pp. 180-81 supra. Judicial power, on the other hand, is an attribute of the court qua
court, of the court as a member of the judicial system. It can only be vested or removed
by the entity creating the court. See pp. 197-200 infra. Dobbs would find it necessary
to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a court has jurisdiction to determine its
jurisdiction over each claim coming before it (albeit that it almost always would),
whereas a determination, once made, that a court exercises judicial power should stand
against all but the most drastic amendment of the court's organic act.
This formulation of judicial power is similar to but broader than Dean Gavit's de-
piction of a court without jurisdiction as a common-law arbitrator, see Gavit, supra
note 78. Gavit recognized the need for finality in dispute resolution, id. at 387, 390,
but the arbitration model fails to accord the result the weight of a judgment and thus
does not eliminate all obstacles to finality. See Bootstrap (pt. 1), supra note 79, at 1014
& n.41. The formulation is also broader than the "general, superior jurisdiction" that
was so crucial to the presumption of validity through the nineteenth century, see note
11 supra. The judicial power disctssed here is an attribute of the court, not of the
form of proceeding.
153. Some state constitutions provide for separation explicitly. E.g., MASS. Cosr.
pt. 1, art. XXX. Others do not make such explicit provision, but have been held to
have an implied provision for separation. See, e.g., In re Greene, 166 N.Y. 485, 492, 60
N.E. 183, 185 (1901) (dictum). It is worth noting, however, that it has not always been
the case that every state provides for separation either implicitly or explicitly. See Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 395-96, 398 (1798) (seriatim opinions of Paterson & Iredell,
JJ.). See generally Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1928).
154. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 126 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 22.10.020 (1976); AIz. CONST.
art. 6, § 6; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-301, -401, -405 (1964); CAL. Co.sT. art. 6, § 5; COLO.
CONsT., art. VI, § 9; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (1977); DEL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 7, 10;
DEL. CODE tit. 10, §§ 341, 541 (1974); FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 5; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2615
(1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 603-21.5 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 1-705 (Supp. 1976); ILL.
COx S. art. 6, § 9; IND. CODE ANN., tit. 33 passim (1975) (one section of Code per county);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 602.1 (West 1975); KAN. STAT. § 20-301 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 23.010 (1970); LA. CONST. art. 5, § 16; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 105 (West Stpp.
1976); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 20; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 212, § 4 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974);
MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.605 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 484.01 (West 1971); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 9-7-81 (1972); MO. ANN. STAT. § 478.070 (Vernon 1952); MONT. CONST. art.
VII, § 4; NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-302 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 3.190 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 491.7 (Supp. 1973); N.J. CONs'r. art. 6, § 3, j, 2; N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 13; N.Y.
Jua. LAW § 140-b (McKinney 1968); N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 12(3); N.D. Coxsr. § 103;
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.01 (Page Supp. 1976); OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 7(a); ORE.
CONST. OF 1857, art. VII, § 9 (now of statutory force only, but still in effect, see ORE.
CONsT. art. 7, § 2); PA. COxsT. art. 5, § 5; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 8-2-13, -14 (1969 & Supp.
1976); S.C. CONST. art. V, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. V, § 5; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-501, -502,
-511, -601, -602 (1955 & Supp. 1976); TEX. REV. Civ. ST.T. ANN. art. 1909 (Vernon 1964);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 113 (Stipp. 1977); VA%. COD §
17-123 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.08.010 (1961); W. VA. CODE § 51-2-2 (1966);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 252.03 (West 1971); WYo. CONST. art. V, § 10. See Dialogue, supra
note 140, at 359-60. States maintaining the law/equity division generally provide for
transferring causes brought in the wrong forum. See, e.g., ARK. STAr. ANN. § 22-405
(1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-511 (Supp. 1976).
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vesting of judicial power in a court is inconsistent with a legislative
imposition of the voidness doctrine on the judgments of that court.
Where the vesting is constitutional,' a legislative attempt to impose
voidness is forbidden; where the vesting is merely statutory, such an
attempt is still inconsistent with the grant and may violate the state's
separation of powers doctrine as well.
The question of congressional attempts to impose voidness on state
judgments is not so straightforward as the purely federal or purely
state questions. Federal/state relations fluctuate constantly, and it is
extraordinarily difficult to separate questions of power from questions
of prudence in the Court's recent federalism decisions. 50 This is a
quagmire that may be avoided here, however, for it is reasonably clear
from the preceding discussion and from the history of the Tenth
Amendment that if a state vests judicial power in one of its courts,
Congress may not impose voidness on that court's judgments.
Whatever view one takes of the substantive effect of the Tenth
Amendment in other areas, 5 7 there is no doubt that the common law,
as a body, was reserved to the states and to state courts, with federal
courts available only if the action or the parties fall under one of the
nine heads of federal jurisdiction.5 8 Moreover, the debates over rati-
fication of the Constitution make clear that protection of the state
judiciaries was an important reason behind the inclusion of the Tenth
Amendment in the Bill of Rights.'5 9 This being the case, it is doubt-
155. E.g., N.J. CoxsT. art. 6, § 3, 2, 3.
156. See Fiss, supra note 114, at 1137 n.108.
157. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Tenth Amend-
ment bars application of amendments to Fair Labor Standards Act to state employees);
Dorsen, The National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: A Problem in Federalism,
49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 45 (1974) (arguing against federally mandated adoption by all states
of "no-fault" vehicle insurance scheme).
158. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938); see THE FEDERALIST No. 82
(A. Hamilton) 553, 554 (J. Cooke ed. 1961); id. No. 83 (A. Hamilton) 558, 561-62; Friendly,
In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383, 394-97
(1964).
159. There was great concern expressed during the ratification debates that the
federal judiciary would supersede that of the states. See, e.g., Centinel I, Independent
Gazetteer (Oct. 5, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION 158, 162-63 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) (fear that appellate jurisdiction
and supremacy clause would combine to place all power in federal judiciary, as control
over jurisdiction had secured power of royal courts in England). Similarly, in North
Carolina, an antifederalist called for an explicit recognition that "what is not given
up to the United States will be retained by the individual states," fearing that otherwise
"[t]he state judiciaries will have very little to do. . . . As all officers are to take an
oath to support the general government it will carry every thing before it." North
Carolina Convention Debates, July 28, 1788, reprinted in 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTfARY HISTORY 937 (1971). Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was the
only proposal contained, in one form or another, in each of the eight state proposals
for a Bill of Rights. 2 B. SCIVWARIZ, supra at 1167.
The Federalists insisted that the nature of the proposed Constitution itself was suf-
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ful that Congress could deprive the states of the power to create courts
to administer that body of law. The observation that "[flaws are a
dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning
and operation"'160 is as applicable to state law and state courts as it
is to the federal law to which it was originally addressed.
In order for state courts to "expound and define" state law, how-
ever, the decision of a state court of last resort 6 must be a final, un-
assailable judgment. 6 2 This says no more than that state courts are
members of the judicial system. The system's signal of finality is the
judgment of one of its component courts, and if those judgments may
be attacked after they have ostensibly become final-after the system
has announced that the underlying dispute is settled-then the system
is not settling disputes, it is offering tentative suggestions. It is to be
emphasized that a statement that a judgment is void is more than a
refusal to give it current effect. It is, rather, an assertion that the
prior dispute could only have been settled in one way, since a con-
trary settlement will be denied to exist. This is an attempt to sub-
stitute background fairness for procedural fairness as the measure of
finality; whenever it is successful it introduces a systematic indeter-
minacy into a process whose goal is determinacy. Congress may, as it
has, empower litigants to remove federal cases from state to federal
courts; 63 Congress may, as it has, empower a federal court to enjoin
state proceedings "where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to pro-
ficient to guarantee state judicial integrity. See THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton)
553, 554 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("The state courts will retain the jurisdiction they now
have, unless it appears to be taken away in one of the enumerated modes."); id. at 555
("state courts will be divested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction, further than
may relate to an appeal"). Despite this insistence, however, when Madison introduced
his proposed Bill of Rights in the First Congress he conceded that the desire for ex-
plicit confirmation of the structural implications was legitimate. Speech before House of
Rep., June 8, 1789, reprinted in 2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra at 1033. For a different construc-
tion of the Tenth Amendment, see 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HIsToRY OF THE UNITED STATES 675-708 (1953). See generally Choper, The Scope of Na-
tional Power Vis-i-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J.
1547, 1611-21 (1977).
160. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (A. Hamilton) 135, 143 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
161. Or the decision of a lower state court, so long as there is a path of appellate
review to the top of the state system and subject always to federal appellate review of
federal questions, real or imagined. See note 201 infra.
162. This is not to say, of course, that Congress may not grant the federal courts
appellate jurisdiction over the state courts. So much, at least, was settled in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). But holding a judgment void is dif-
ferent from reversing it on appeal. A characteristic of the voidness doctrine is that it
operates after the time for appeal has expired. See Bootstrap (pt. 1), supra note 79, at
1003 & n.4. Indeed, voidness attacks generally occur in a court that does not have
appellate jurisdiction over the court that entered the original judgment. See, e.g., At-
lantic Coast Line R.R. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 296 (1970).
163. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1444 (1970).
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tect or effectuate its judgments.' ' 164 But Congress may not, as it has
on occasion attempted to do,165 displace the judgmental finality of
the state courts. That is a direct attack on the basis of their judicial
power and is barred by the Tenth Amendment. 66
There are some problems in creating a doctrine of indefeasible
judicial power based on the Tenth Amendment. Although the drafts-
men did indeed see the Tenth Amendment in part as a protection
of state judicial power, they might not have accepted the argument,
made above, that it defeats the voidness doctrine. The doctrine did
exist in England at the time of the Revolution, 167 and there is no
indication that the Framers intended to reject it entirely. But it is
not at all clear what voidness doctrine, if any, the Framers intended
to adopt, or, indeed, whether they thought about the issue at all. What
is clear is that every decision concerning questions of judicial power
made in the drafting of the Constitution came down on the side of
finality. From the full faith and credit clause to the existence of "one
supreme Court" as federal umpire, the Constitution reflects the con-
cern of the Framers that the indecision of the Confederacy not be
repeated. 68 Thus although the nature of judicial power is an evolving
concept, the Tenth Amendment's protection of state judicial power
may appropriately be viewed as evolving in tandem with the power
itself.'6 9
164. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
165. See pp. 176-77 supra; pp. 211-16 infra.
166. But cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (enforcement powers granted
Congress under § 5 of Fourteenth Amendment override state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity to suits in federal courts). If Congress were to couple a grant of exclusive
jurisdiction with a finding that exclusivity is necessary to guarantee some Fourteenth
Amendment right, and if that finding were sustained as a valid exercise of § 5
enforcement power, then the Tenth Amendment restriction might well be circumvented.
The closest Congress has come to doing so, however, has been to enact the removal
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970)). That statute received a narrow construction in City of Green-
wood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966), although removal was allowed in the companion
case of Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
167. See pp. 165-66 supra.
168. See HART & WECHSLER 6 n.19.
169. Cf. IV. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 173 (1908)
("The general lines of definition which were to run between the powers granted to
Congress and the powers reserved to the States the makers of the Constitution were
able to draw with their characteristic foresight and lucidity; but the subject-matter
of that definition is constantly changing .... ")
For example, it is clear that so far as state sovereign power is concerned, provision
of a fair opportunity to litigate is all that is required for a court to bind a party over
whom it has personal jurisdiction. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Sherrer v.
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939); see
notes 56, 77 & 103 supra. Thus, at least in full faith and credit cases, process has re-
placed sovereign prerogative as a defining attribute of judicial power. Cf. pp. 172-73
supra (development of longarm jurisdiction).
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There is nothing in the Constitution to require a federal court/
state court voidness doctrine, especially since the option was left to
Congress not to create inferior federal courts at all. 170 Moreover, Pro-
fessor Degnan has argued persuasively that the federal/state full faith
and credit statute' 7 ' is actually declaratory of an underlying consti-
tutional norm, the same norm as constitutional state/state full faith
and credit..72 If this is the case, then state/state and federal/state full
faith and credit should be analyzed in pari materia. Due process is
a constitutional limitation on state judicial power, but the Tenth
Amendment may reasonably be said to protect that power from non-
constitutional attacks. If one looks at the judicial system not merely
as a collection of separate subsystems tied loosely together by Supreme
Court review, but rather as a whole-the fundamental dispute-settling
mechanism of our society, its pieces united by a common process-
then the Tenth Amendment does nothing more or less than guarantee
to the states the right to be a part of the system. A court, when
deciding a case, is settling a specific dispute between specific parties.
If unappealed, its decision is final. It follows that a court vested with
judicial power by its creating entity can never be said to have en-
tered a judgment void for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The
court simply has not acted beyond its powers.
C. The Proper Interpretation of Jurisdictional Statutes
The preceding discussion has developed a theory of judicial power
largely immune to legislative incursion. It does not follow from that
theory, however, that legislative statements as to jurisdiction are
meaningless, that all jurisdictional statutes are unconstitutional abridg-
ments of judicial power. Indeed, such a conclusion would be as severe
an attack on the legislative role of ordering society in the large as
the voidness doctrine is on the judicial role of resolving individual
disputes. It remains to provide an interpretation of jurisdictional
statutes consistent with both of these roles.
When a legislature grants or denies a court jurisdiction over a
class of actions, it must define that class in some way. Moreover, one
cannot determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of an action without first determining what is "the subject
matter" of the action. At the very least, therefore, a statute allocating
jurisdiction over a certain class of actions becomes a part of the sub-
170. See HART 8 'EV£CHSLER 11-12 & n.46.
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970).
172. See Degnan, supra note 39, at 749-55. For development of this form of con-
stitutional argument, see C. BLACK, STRUcTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1969).
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stantive law governing that class. The allocation statute does not
reach ultimate judicial power, but neither is it merely hortatory. Un-
der the theory of this Note, it is still error for a court to exceed its
jurisdiction.
But jurisdictional statutes need not be confined to the same ambit
as other statutes; there is yet room to accord jurisdictional statutes
a special status without infringing on judicial power. Such statutes
do not merely speak of classes of actions, they speak of classes of ac-
tions in conjunction with courts. 173 Due respect for the legislature,
therefore, requires that courts treat jurisdictional statutes with respect,
thereby avoiding confrontations on the level of naked judicial power
wherever possible. It is thus entirely appropriate that questions of
jurisdiction be raised by a court sua sponte 174 or for the first time on
appeal. 175 Motions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction can generally
be heard and resolved expeditiously, 176 and can form the basis for
interlocutory appellate review either by statutory procedure 77 or by
writ of mandamus or prohibition. 178 These procedural devices may
have evolved as devices to curb excesses of power, 79 a concept essen-
tially meaningless under the theory of this Note, but they should
nevertheless be retained. For until a dispute has been resolved by a
final judgment, it is proper for courts to defer to the greatest ex-
tent possible to the legislative will.18° Once the resolution becomes
final, however, the earlier special focus on questions of jurisdiction
provides added reason not to allow a jurisdictional attack, since those
questions are much less likely to have been overlooked than ones in
which the court does not have its own interest to protect.' 8 '
173. See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE. THE LABOR INJUNCTION 205-14 (1930).
174. E.g., Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884); Dekrell v. Johnson,
404 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Mauran v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 104 R.I. 604, 606,
247 A.2d 853, 855 (1968); see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Federal courts tend to pursue
this possibility more seriously than do state courts. Beyond Bootstrap, supra note 79,
at 492 n.6.
175. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951); see HART & WECHSLER
835-40. But see note 189 infra (jurisdictional questions may appropriately be foreclosed
prior to appeal in some circumstances).
176. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 3211(a)(2), (e) (McKinney 1970) (motion to dis-
miss for want of subject-matter jurisdiction available both before and after answer filed).
177. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1970); see, e.g., Burchett v. Bardahl Oil Co., 470 F.2d
793, 796 (10th Cir. 1972); Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, S.A., 290 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1961).
But see Austracan, (U.S.A.) Inc. v. M/V Lemoncore, 500 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1974).
178. E.g., Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Sampsell v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d
763, 766-73, 197 P.2d 739, 742-46 (1948).
179. See pp. 165-66 & note 7 supra.
180. Cf. note 140 supra (discussion of Ex parte McCardle). For a discussion of when
deference might be inappropriate, see note 189 infra.
181. This argument has diminished force when the judgment was entered by default,
but even in such a case there are reasons to hold the judgment binding. See p. 224
& note 282 infra.
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An exception to this analysis of jurisdictional statutes may appear
to arise concerning statutes that withdraw jurisdiction in response to
perceived abuses of judicial power. It may be argued that such statutes,
because they represent the only method (short of mass impeachments)
to curb a judiciary thought to be usurping power, should not be held
to be unconstitutional. But there is no need to treat those jurisdic-
tional statutes differently from other jurisdictional statutes.
The classic example of a legislative response to judicial overreaching
occurred during the first third of this century, when federal judges
were thought to be abusing their equity powers on behalf of man-
agement in labor disputes. 8 2 Congress reacted by enacting the Norris-
LaGuardia Act,'8 3 which withdrew the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes without following elab-
orate precautionary procedures.184 In United States v. United Mline
Workers,'8 5 a divided Supreme Court rejected an attempt by the union
and its officers, who were cited for criminal contempt for violating
a federal district court restraining order in a labor dispute, to raise
the asserted lack of jurisdiction of the district court as a defense to
the contempt charges.' 86 Justice Frankfurter, who as Professor Frank-
furter had participated in drafting the Act and was largely respon-
sible for its emphasis on jurisdiction, 8 7 voted to sustain the convic-
tions in Mine Workers. He emphasized that the Act had not removed
the power of the federal courts to act as courts:
[N]o type of controversy is more peculiarly fit for judicial deter-
mination than a controversy that calls into question the power
of a court to decide ...
.'. Only when a court is so obviously traveling outside its orbit
as to be merely usurping judicial forms and facilities, may an
order issued by a court be disobeyed and treated as though it
were a letter to a newspaper. Short of an indisputable want of
authority on the part of a court, the very existence of a court
presupposes its power to entertain a controversy, if only to decide,
after deliberation, that it has no power over the particular con-
troversy ...
182. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 173.
183. Ch. 92, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970)).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970).
185. 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (plurality opinion).
186. Id. at 289-95 (plurality opinion). The Court's decision had two alternative bases,
neither of which commanded the support of a majority of the Court. Justice Frankfurter
was the fifth vote for affirmance, joining in the second part of the Court's opinion only.
187. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85
YALE L.J. 914, 914 n.1 (1976); see F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 173, at 199-228.
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To be sure, an obvious limitation upon a court cannot be cir-
cumvented by a frivolous inquiry into the existence of a power
that has unquestionably been withheld .... In such a case, a judge
would not be acting as a court. He would be a pretender to, not
a wielder of, judicial power.' 8
As Justice Frankfurter indicated, litigants are not left helpless be-
fore usurping courts. If a court deliberately ignores the legislative
mandate and usurps power to impose its will in a particular way,
then the judgment would be void in any case, since due process re-
quires an impartial tribunal. 8 9 Against anything less than such a de-
liberate overreaching, however, the adversary process ought to provide
188. 330 U.S. at 309-10 (concurring in result only).
189. E.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973). Dobbs suggests that the
Restatement's first criterion-"clear" lack of jurisdiction-may have been intended as
evidentiary on the question of conscious usurpation. Bootstrap (pt. 2), supra note 79,
at 1251, 1255. Equally likely, however, is that the criterion was a straightforward reaction
to two cases decided early in this century: Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
254 U.S. 348 (1920) (clear exclusion of insurance companies from provisions of Bank-
ruptcy Act requires purported liquidation in bankruptcy of insurance company be held
void), and In re New York Tunnel Co., 166 F. 284 (2d Cir. 1908) (building companies
not entitled to benefits of Bankruptcy Act, but tunnel company arguably not a building
company, so lack of jurisdiction does not appear on face of record). See Stoll v. Gottlieb,
305 U.S. 165, 175 (1938) (discussion of Vallely); F. JAMES, supra note 1, at 538-39 (com-
paring Vallely and New York Tunnel). There is also a discussion in Chicot of possible
reasons why the jurisdictional statute involved there might not have been unconstitutional
as applied to the proceedings being attacked, 308 U.S. at 377. That discussion might
have provided a more immediate basis than Vallely and New York Tunnel for the se-
lection of the first criterion in the Restatement's test.
Since the test is the impartiality of the tribunal, one must consider the effect of a
court's consciously usurping power for reasons not related to prejudgment of the liti-
gation. It may be difficult to imagine a benign usurpation, but one arguably occurred
in Di Frischia v. New York Central R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960), which reversed
a judgment dismissing the action for want of diversity. The parties had stipulated the
requisite jurisdictional facts and extensive pretrial proceedings had been held, and after
the statute of limitations had run the defendant sought to withdraw the stipulation
and dismiss the action. The district court acquiesced, but the Third Circuit reversed,
refusing to permit defendant to "play fast and loose with the judicial machinery and
deceive the courts." Id. at 144. Accord, ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BE-
TWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1386 at 64-66, 366-74 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
ALI STUDY]; Beyond Bootstrap, supra note 179. Di Frischia has been described as not
"particularly generative," HART & WESCHLER 838, but the Eighth Circuit recently relied
on it (and on the ALL STUDY) as support for affirming a district court's rejection of
an attack on jurisdiction that was first made near the end of trial. Kroger v. Owen
Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417, 425-27 & nn.34-37 (8th Cir. 1977). See also id. at
419 & n.2 (admission of jurisdiction may be binding).
Di Frischia suggests that impartiality should indeed be the test and that "usurpation"
may occasionally be justifiable. Courts should continue to be alert to their own ex-
cesses of jurisdiction as an exercise of that self-restraint so central to judicial integrity.
They should not, however, hesitate to invoke their inherent powers as members of the
judicial system to condition dismissals on agreement not to object to reinstitution in
an appropriate forum, cf. D. LoUISELL & G. HAZARD, supra note I, at 394-95 (condi-
tional dismissals on forum non conveniens grounds), or even to proceed to judgment
in extreme cases. See Beyond Bootstrap, supra note 79, at 522-29.
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sufficient protection. If the jurisdictional issue is raised it may be
preserved for appeal; if it is not raised there is little reason to treat
the failure differently from other errors a litigant may make.190 Er-
roneous decisions on nonjurisdictional issues can be at least as trou-
bling in terms of abuse of judicial power as are errors respecting juris-
diction.191
190. Cf. p. 190 supra (failure to appeal erroneous decision as to jurisdiction).
191. Compare In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962) with Walker v. City of Birmingham,
388 U.S. 307 (1967). Green, attorney for a union involved in a labor dispute, was cited
for criminal contempt by an Ohio state court for counselling disobedience to an anti-
picketing injunction entered in a labor dispute. He was convicted without being per-
mitted to litigate his claim that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute,
and the conviction was eventually upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court, which relied on
the Mine Workers doctrine, see pp. 202-03 supra. In re Green, 172 Ohio St. 269, 175
N.E.2d 59 (1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 689 (1962). The United States Supreme Court reversed
on the ground that due process forbade convicting Green for contempt without per-
mitting him to challenge the state court's jurisdiction to enter the underlying order.
369 U.S. at 693. The Court, per Douglas, J., distinguished Mine Workers on the ground
that that case arose in a federal court, and thus no issue of federal preemption was present.
Id. at 692 n.l. This reasoning was criticized by Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Clark,
who voted to remand solely to permit Green to demonstrate that opposing counsel
and the trial judge had agreed that contempt proceedings might be used to test the
court's jurisdiction. Absent such an agreement Justice Harlan would have found Mine
Workers controlling. Id. at 693-97.
Walker arose on facts analogous to those of Green. An Alabama court issued a very
broad ex parte injunction at 9 o'clock on a Wednesday night that prohibited civil
rights demonstrations planned for the following Friday and Sunday. 388 U.S. at 321-22
(reprinting injunction). The defendants did not move to vacate the injunction; instead,
they announced their belief that it was unconstitutional and that they could not ob-
tain justice in Alabama courts, and the demonstrations took place as planned. Id. at
310-11, 323-24. On Monday the defendants did move to dissolve the injunction, but
they were cited for criminal contempt and, as in Green, were convicted without being
permitted to challenge the validity of the injunction. A sharply divided Supreme Court
affirmed; Justice Stewart's opinion for the five-member majority placing great emphasis
on defendants' failure to move to vacate the injunction prior to disobeying it. Id. at
318-19. Green was distinguished in a footnote, as follows:
Relying on the pre-emptive command of the federal labor law, the [Green] Court
held that the state courts were required to hear Green's claim that the state court
was without jurisdiction to issue the injunction. The petitioner in Green, unlike the
petitioners here, had attempted to challenge the validity of the injunction before
violating it by promptly applying to the issuing court for an order vacating the
injunction. The petitioner in Green had further offered to prove that the court
issuing the injunction had agreed to its violation as an appropriate means of testing
its validity.
Id. at 315 n.6 (emphasis in original). Chief Justice Warren, in dissent, found difficulty
with the Court's seeming elevation of the close jurisdictional question in Green over
the First Amendment, id. at 332, and suggested that the Court's second ground for
distinguishing Green was "nothing but an attempt to alter the holding of that case,"
since "[t]he alleged circumstance that the court issuing the injunction had agreed to
its violation as an appropriate means of testing its validity was considered only in a
concurring opinion," id. at 332 n.9.
A literal reading of Green and H'alker suggests that the Court was indeed elevating
a statutory preemption of jurisdiction oxer the First Amendment. The ll'alher Court
appeared to regard as a matter of some significance the fact that "[t]he Alabama Su-
preme Court has apparently never in any criminal contempt case entertained a claim of
non-jurisdictional error," 388 U.S. at 319. See id. at 319-20. This second mention of
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It may be argued that the emphasis in this Note on litigation as
the resolution of disputes between specific parties neglects third-party
or general policy interests in judgments, and that one of the functions
of the voidness doctrine is to preserve those interests and policies,
albeit at some cost in finality.' 92 But although third-party interests
are occasionally affected by judgments, a litigating party will not raise
such interests unless it is to his advantage to do so, and there is very
little to weigh against the two-bites-of-the-apple problem. 93 Nothing
jurisdiction suggests that the Court may well have intended the issue to be taken
seriously. If so, then Green could have behaved as did the Walker defendants and still
have challenged the injunction in contempt proceedings, and such an elevation of form
over substance would be a powerful argument in favor of eliminating the voidness
doctrine. And even if the Court's remarks on jurisdiction in Walker were not meant to
carry great weight, that they were made illustrates the obscurative effect of jurisdictional
analyses. Justice Douglas made the same mistake when he cast part of his First Amend-
ment argument in jurisdictional terms. See id. at 337-38 (dissenting opinion). See gen-
erally Error, supra note 79.
The inadequacy of a rigid distinction between jurisdictional and other types of errors
has been noted by Professor Cox. Cox, supra note 78, at 110-11 ("the circumstances that
should be regarded by justifying .. .disobedience [to invalid restraining orders] have
no necessary relevance to the distinction between orders void because made without
jurisdiction of the subject matter and orders that are merely erroneous"). Under the
Cox anal)sis (written before Valker), the division in the Walker Court is accounted for
by differing views on the relationship between the First Amendment and the state's
interest in preserving public order, as well as by the varying assessments of the possibility
of a successful attempt to dissolve the injunction prior to the demonstrations. The
analysis also foreshadows Justice Harlan's concurrence in Green.
192. See Consent, supra note 5, at 79 & n.155. This argument frequently takes the
form of giving the attacking party standing to vindicate a perceived public policy. E.g.,
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 361-63, 367 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (full faith
and credit should not mandate recognition of foreign divorce judgments where domicile
not genuinely litigated, since to do so would defeat interest of true domicile state and
demean judicial system by condoning "conduct . . .which, in any other type of liti-
gation, would be regarded as perjury, but which is not so regarded where divorce is
involved because ladies and gentlemen indulge in it"); Gavit, supra note 78, at 392
(state should not be bound by divorce decree of court lacking jurisdiction, but husband
and wife should be bound if both appeared). But see Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343,
356 (1948) ("That vital interests are invohed in divorce litigation indicates to us that
it is a matter of greater rather than lesser importance that there should be a place to
end such litigation.") (footnote omitted).
193. The "public policy" type of third-party interest, see note 192 supra, is frequently
subsumable under the interest of one of the parties. Thus, in Kalb, the Frazier-Lemke
Act policy of protection for impecunious farmers, although designed in part to ease
national economic dislocation, see 308 U.S. at 443, operated directly for the benefit of
farmer Kalb. Under such circumstances it is not unreasonable to require the party to
raise the jus teriii directly or forgo its benefits. There are, it is true, policy interests
that do not correspond so directly to the interest of a party, a good example being
the national interest in avoiding labor unrest embodied in § I of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). Nevertheless, these interests may still be raised
by the parties during the litigation, and unless the litigation is collusive and the court
asleep, it is likely that the issue will not be overlooked. By appropriately limiting the
ensuing judgment's scope, see pp. 206-07 infra, one may restrict its impact to the
parties originally before the court. Moreover, if it is felt that the parties will not suf-
ficiently protect an inchoate public interest, it is possible to embody that interest in a
public agency. Compare NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 145 & n.3 (1971) (federal
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said here would prevent a third party from attacking a judgment as
fraudulent as against him, 94 but it would be unfair to allow a par-
ticipant in a fraud to back out because he does not like the results. 195
A point frequently ignored by voidness decisions based upon expan-
sive definitions of jurisdiction'96 is that an inquiry into the effect
of a judgment may not end with a determination of its validity. The
scope of the judgment-questions such as the persons bound, the
issues precluded, and the exact nature of the claim determined-must
still be defined. 97 Allocations of jurisdiction may indeed be relevant
in determining, for example, whether a state court judgment on a
state claim is preclusive of a related federal claim.'98
It cannot be too strongly emphasized, however, that there is an
court may enjoin enforcement of state labor injunction at behest of NLRB, "sole pro-
tector" of national interest in labor field) with Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Locomotive
Engineers, 398 U.S. 281 (1970) (federal court may not consistently with Anti-Injunction Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), enjoin enforcement of state labor injunction at behest of union,
despite clear federal preemption). See also, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1012(b) (McKinney
1976): "When the constitutionality of a statute of the state is involved in an action to
which the state is not a party, the court shall notify the attorney-general, who shall
be permitted to intervene in support of its constitutionality."
194. E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (state allowed to attack
foreign ex parte divorces); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1975)
(collusive state judgment cannot defeat title earlier held valid by federal court); Rialto
Pub. Co. v. Bass, 325 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1963) (certain payments under judgment void-
able preference). See also FiRST RESTATEMENT § 115(1) (equitable attacks by third parties).
195. See note 189 supra.
196. For a classic attempt to cast an issue in jurisdictional terms in order to permit
collateral attack, see Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 337-38 (1967) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
197. See Consent, supra note 5, at 79 & n.155. Most of the First Restatement is con-
cerned with questions of scope. FIRST RESTATEMENT §§ 41-111. See also SECOND RESTATE-
MENT §§ 41-76; id. (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975) (all sections appearing); id. (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1976) (all sections appearing).
198. E.g., Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1143-45 (2d Cir. 1970);
Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1967); cf. Hutchings v.
United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970) (effect of prior arbitration).
See generally Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior
State-Court Determinations, 53 VA. L. REV. 1360 (1967). See also Developments in the
Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1330-60 (1977).
Jurisdictional questions regularly interact with scope determinations when plaintiffs
endeavor to collect both tort damages and compensation awards. See, e.g., Mike Hooks,
Inc. v. Pena, 313 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1963); Busick v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 7
Cal. 3d 967, 500 P.2d 1386, 104 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1972). Labor cases have produced delicate
scope determinations turning on questions of jurisdiction, see, e.g., New Orleans Typo-
graphical Union No. 17 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966) (prior judgment com-
pelling arbitration, though valid, superseded by NLRB order), as have domestic rela-
tions cases, see, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (ex parte decree granting
divorce and adjudicating custody rights valid as to divorce but invalid as to custody;
state may not determine custody without personal jurisdiction over defendant spouse);
cf. Sampsell v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 763, 773-81, 197 P.2d 739, 746-51 (1948) (Traynor,
J.) (proposing test for determining jurisdiction over custody disputes). For a well-
reasoned analysis of a case involving both validity and scope problems, see United
States v. Eastport S.S. Corp., 255 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1958).
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enormous difference between attacks on validity and determinations
of scope. Every determination of scope starts from the assumption of
a valid judgment, and the inquiry proceeds in the direction of re-
lating that judgment to the current litigation. 199 Finality is of para-
mount importance, but there are other factors that may enter into
consideration. The process is dynamic. It is fully capable of treating
a suit to enforce a judgment for the payment of money, where fi-
nality is likely to be the only consideration, differently from a private
federal antitrust suit in which is raised a judgment from a related state
action.2 00 Voidness analyses, by contrast, are entirely static. The in-
quiry begins and ends with the prior judgment. For the reasons dis-
cussed above, these analyses should be limited to due process ques-
tions so that the judicial system may better fulfill its role as society's
ultimate settler of disputes.
20 1
199. E.g., In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 914 (Sp. Ct., Reg. Rail
Reorg. Act 1974) (Friendly, J.). See SECOND RESTATEMIENT §§ 61, 61.1, 61.2, 68; id. § 68.1
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
200. E.g., Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 825 (1955); see Note, supra note 198, at 1364-69.
201. Having now determined the correct way to approach jurisdictional statutes, it
becomes possible to complete the analysis of the unappealable judgment and its effect
on the systemic analysis of pp. 188-92 supra. It immediately becomes apparent that
the appealability of a judgment may well be a factor in determining that judgment's
validity. See Friedman v. State, 24 N.Y. 2d 528, 535-36, 249 N.E. 2d 369, 373-74, 301
N.Y.S.2d 484, 490 (1969) (unavailability of appeal from Court on the Judiciary factor
in reaching merits of subsequent suit by ousted judge for back salary); cf. In re Stern,
235 F. Supp. 680, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (Weinfeld, J.) (attack permitted because, inter alia,
"movants' timely efforts to seek appellate review were frustrated by imposition of a
condition upon their right of appeal"). An unappealable judgment does not have the
benefit of the regression from the premise of absolute Supreme Court validity, and must
rely instead solely on the philosophical basis of preclusion theory. That basis is a
powerful impetus toward finality, but it is only one aspect of the system, and un-
appealable judgments are therefore halfway outside the system. On a superficial level,
therefore, it appears that legislatures may affect judicial power to the extent they may
control appellate jurisdiction.
But if the theory of this Note is correct, one would expect to find some tension
between courts and legislatures where appellate jurisdiction is concerned, and this has
indeed been the case. In Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), for example,
the Court acquiesced in a withdrawal of its appellate jurisdiction over a certain class
of habeas corpus cases, but it was careful to note that there were other paths of ap-
pellate review. Id. at 515; see HART & WECHSLER 312 n.l. More recently, in Thermtron
Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), the Court held that mandamus would
lie to compel a district court to exercise its jurisdiction in a diversity removal case
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1970), despite an explicit statutory command that the district
court's order remanding the case to the state court was "not reviewable on appeal or
otherwise," id. § 1447(d).
The proper resolution of this confrontation between legislatures and the judicial system
is to regard unappealable judgments as analogous to actions of administrative tribunals
for which no statutory review is provided. If a dispute arises concerning the validity
of a putatively unreviewable administrative action, that dispute often may be resolved
by the judicial system, whether means to secure resolution is called collateral attack,
mandamus, quo warranto, or judicial review. See Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local
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III. Kalb and Fidelity Revisited
This Note has argued that the basic premises of the voidness doc-
trine-the equation of jurisdiction and judicial power and the conse-
quent submission of judicial power to legislative control-are faulty,
that they do not give adequate recognition to the societal need for
finality in dispute resolution as the foundation of judicial power.
But the voidness doctrine is not dead. Despite the sweeping language
the Court has used in rejecting voidness attacks in many cases, Kalb
and Fidelity stand unreversed. Indeed, the Railroad Special Court
recently relied on those two cases in holding void a federal district
court judgment in a case over which the Railroad Court felt it had
exclusive jurisdiction.20 2 In addition, the Supreme Court's approving
citation of the Restatement's balancing test 203 in Durfee v. Duke
2°4
Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968) (preinduction review of draft classification permitted
despite statute ostensibly denying such review); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958)
(NLRB action in violation of express statutory command enjoined under general com-
merce jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970), despite purported exclusive nature of review
under labor statutes); Dialogue, supra note 140, at 348-60. Similarly, ostensibly unre-
viewable judgments may be reviewed by extraordinary means, as Hermansdolfer (man-
damus) and Friedman (collateral attack) demonstrate.
A similar analysis may be applied to justice courts and other courts of sharply limited
jurisdiction, which have at least as much in common with the old English local courts
and with administrative agencies as they do with trial courts of general jurisdiction.
See L. JAFFE, supra note 139, at 632-33. Courts of sharply limited jurisdiction hae
never had the benefit of any of the countervailing doctrines to the voidness doctrine,
such as the verity-of-the-record presumption. See pp. 165-66 & note 11 supra. As a matter
of state law their judgments are likely to be subject to greater scrutiny than judgments
of the state's top-level trial courts. See, e.g., State ex rel. City of Mayfield Heights v.
Bartunek, 12 Ohio App. 2d 141, 231 N.E.2d 326 (1967) (probate court not entitled to
presumption of regularity when exercising special statutory jurisdiction). To the extent
one is willing to regard courts of sharply limited jurisdiction as partially outside the
judicial system, it is reasonable to deny their judgments the absolute validity accorded
those of "judicial" courts.
Determining which courts are intended to be "judicial" may be difficult, as may be
determining how much deference should be given to the views of those courts not so
intended concerning their own jurisdiction. But because a court's place in the judicial
system is determined by its organic statute (or constitutional prolision), see pp. 194-99
supra, the difficulties engender problems solely of state law. In solving the first
problem one may look for guidance to the cases devoted to determining whether a
given court was a "superior" court and therefore entitled to the verity-of-the-record
presumption. See A. FREETAN, supra note 11, at 92-94. To determine the degree of def-
erence due the evaluation by a court of limited jurisdiction of the extent of its own
power, any of the balancing tests-Dobbs's (legislative intent), Moore's (confidence re-
posed), or the Restatement's (five factors)-is likely to provide a reasonable approach.
202. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Illinois, 423 F. Supp. 941, 947-50 (Sp. Ct., Reg. Rail
Reorg. Act 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1111 (1977). ConRail had litigated the jurisdic-
tional issue in the prior action, but the Special Court held that the urgency of its con-
gressional mandate compelled it "to hold that Congress concluded that the policies
supporting our exclusive jurisdiction outweigh the policies of res judicata." Id. at 950
(citing, inter alia, Fidelity and FiRsT RESTATEMENT § 10).
203. See p. 178 & note 75 supra.
204. 375 U.S. 106, 114 n.12 (1963). See note 77 supra.
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suggests that it has not foreclosed the option of holding judgments
void on grounds other than due process. Finally, there is no doubt
that CongTess thinks it can provide for voiding state judgments: the
1970 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act contain explicit voidness
language.
05
It follows from the theory of judicial power presented in this Note
that Kalb and Fidelity are wrong and that the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments are unconstitutional. Because the theory was developed on a
rather abstract level, however, one might regard Kalb, Fidelity, and
the Amendments as proof that the theory is incorrect. The goal of
this Part is to show that the conflict between the cases and statutes,
on the one hand, and the theory of judicial power, on the other,
should be resolved in favor of the theory.
A. Kalb: The Decision That Was Not
In Kalb, it will be recalled, the Court held that Congress "intended
to, and did" provide that the filing of a Frazier-Lemke Act petition
should deprive state courts of all power over the filing farmer-debtor.
Thus, the decree confirming the foreclosure sale of the Kalbs' farm
was held to be void, since the decree had been entered while a Frazier-
Lemke petition was pending.20 6 There are two reasons why that hold-
ing does not stand with full force against the theory of judicial power
of this Note. First, the Court chose not to rely upon grounds for
decision that would have been consistent both with its precedents
and with the argument here. The Court could, and should, have de-
cided the case on simple lack of notice/due process grounds. Second,
the Court did not advert to a possible distinction between judicial
power and jurisdictional allocations; its decision, therefore, does not
squarely address a theory that relies upon such a distinction.
It appears from the briefs before the Court that the Kalbs had
served a copy of the reinstatement order on the foreclosure judge
personally prior to the confirmation hearing, and that they had filed
205. Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, § 3, 84 Stat. 991
(amending § 14(f) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 32(f) (1970)).
206. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 440-44 (1940). See pp. 176-77 and notes 60, 61,
& 64 supra.
There is some question as to whether the foreclosure court (Walworth County Court)
was a court of general jurisdiction, for its organic statute conferred it with general law
and equity jurisdiction only over claims for $25,000 or less. 1907 Wis. Laws, ch. 234, § I
(quoted in Brief of the Respondents in No. 120, at 39-40, Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S.
433 (1940)). But the Court treated the county court as one of general jurisdiction. 308
U.S. at 439. See also note 201 supra (vesting of judicial power in state courts matter of
state law only).
209
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 87: 164, 1977
another copy with the clerk of the court on the day of the hearing.20
The hearing was adjourned indefinitely, but a week later, without
further notice to the Kalbs, the court confirmed the sale.208 If this
was in fact the case, the confirmation decree may well have been
void for want of due process.209 On this reading Kalb is not inconsis-
tent with the theory of this Note, for failure of process is an appro-
priate-indeed, the only appropriate-reason to deny a judgment all
preclusive effect. 210 But the Kalb Court did not address the due process
issue.2 11 Motivated perhaps by a desire to emphasize the importance
of the substantive policies at issue, the Kalb Court preserved the void-
207. Brief of the Appellants in Nos. 120 & 121, at 4-5, Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S.
433 (1940).
208. Id.
209. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 228 (1946) (decree reducing alimony arrears to
judgment, entered without notice to defendant husband, void for want of due process
to extent of alimony accruing subsequent to husband's last court appearance). Griffin
was decided six years after Kalb, but the result in Griffin followed directly from Wuchter
v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928). See 327 U.S. at 228. In Kalb the crucial question as to
notice was whether the state court had adjourned the confirmation hearing indefi-
nitely or had merely reserved decision. Compare Brief of the Appellants in Nos. 120
& 121, at 5 with Brief of the Respondents in No. 121, at 3-4. In the latter case, notice
would have been immaterial, since no further hearings would have been contemplated.
See Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 233 (1946) (decree not void to extent it merely con-
firmed earlier decree as to which husband had had notice).
The Griffin Court spoke of "notice by personal or substituted service," id. at 228
(emphasis added), and one might therefore argue that active litigants such as the Kalbs
may be required to obtain notice from, for example, court calendars. See, e.g., Iskovitz
v. Sakran, 226 Md. 453, 174 A.2d 172 (1961). But the combination of the service of the
reinstatement petition on the judge and the indefinite adjournment, plus the fact that
preemption was not a suddenly raised issue-the Feuersteins did not move to initiate
the sheriff's sale until after the first petition had been dismissed-suggests that the
Kalbs had a reasonable expectation that nothing would happen without further notice.
Griffin implies that violation of this expectation constituted lack of due process. Cf.
Smith v. Smith, 427 Pa. 535, 538, 235 A.2d 127, 128 (1967) (defendant who has been
represented by several attorneys during course of action "entitled to more than mere
notification in a legal journal as to the date, time and place of trial").
210. See p. 188 supra.
Dobbs suggests that "[i]f Kalb had appeared and had litigated the issue of the state
court's jurisdiction . . . . his very appearance in the state court would have defeated
the protection Congress sought to offer him, and there would be little reason not to
bind him by the judgment of the state court." Bootstrap (pt. 2), supra note 79, at
1253. Dobbs does not advert to the suggestion in Durfee that the Court looks to the
litigated/unlitigated distinction simply as an indication of how likely it is that the prior
result concerning jurisdiction would have a colorable basis, 375 U.S. at 113-14 & n.12.
He does, however, note that the Court has on occasion regarded the distinction as sig-
nificant. Bootstrap (pt. 2), supra note 79, at 1245 & n.22 (citing Fidelity and Stoll).
211. The Kalbs did not explicitly raise the due process issue in the Supreme Court.
see Statement as to Jurisdiction in No. 120 at 1; Statement as to Jurisdiction in No.
121 at I; Brief of the Appellants in Nos. 120 & 121 at 3-7, Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308
U.S. 433 (1940), but they laid very heavy stress on the notice problem in their "Statement
of the Case," id. at 5. It would not have been unthinkable for the Court to have ad-
dressed the issue sua sponte. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40 (1971).
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ness doctrine in face of adequate alternative grounds for decision..
2 12
In addition to overlooking the due process issue, the Kalb Court
did not distinguish between judicial power and jurisdictional alloca-
tions. That is, the Court accepted that Congress, in allocating juris-
diction under the bankruptcy clause,21' could displace state courts
from membership in the judicial system. The Court's only acknowl-
edgment that there might be a federalism problem in the case was in a
footnote: "That a state court before which a proceeding is compe-
tently initiated may-by operation of supreme federal law-lose juris-
diction to proceed to a judgment unassailable on collateral attack is
not a concept unknown to our federal system." 214 The two cases cited
to support this proposition, however, were habeas corpus cases turning
on flagrant denials of due process at the original trial.2 a3 Neither case
addresses the assault on the judicial system implicated when an al-
location of jurisdiction is enforced after judgment in a civil action2 16
conducted in accord with due process.
21 7
B. Kalb Rampant: The 1970 Bankruptcy Amendments
The problem that faced the Court in Kalb has recently resurfaced
in remarkably similar form. In the 1970 Amendments to the Bank-
212. In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962) (discussed in note 191 supra), was also a pre-
emption case and also had an adequate alternative ground for decision. Indeed, the
Court's language in Stoll, Chicot, Kalb, and Green emphasizes protection of federal
courts and federal judgments. If the federal/state distinction is in fact part of the law in
this area it should be extirpated as soon as possible. The institutional base of preclusion
theory applies forcefully here. It would be unseemly for the Court to take a parochial
outlook in its role as umpire of the federal system. See pp. 185-86 and notes 1ll & 114
supra.
213. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
214. 308 U.S. at 440 n.12 (citing Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) and Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
215. In Moore the Court reversed a federal district court's dismissal on demurrer of
a habeas petition that alleged "that the appellants were hurried to conviction under
the pressure of a mob without any regard for their rights and without according to
them due process of law." 261 U.S. at 87. The detailed allegations of the petition paint
a stark picture of a judicial lynching. See id. at 87-90. Johnson involved denial of pe-
titioner's right to counsel, 304 U.S. at 459, and was, moreover, an attempt to obtain
relief from a federal conviction.
The Kalb Court in fact did a marked disservice to Justice Holmes's eloquent opinion
in Moore. That opinion is cast throughout in due process language, and its only mention
of the word "jurisdiction" comes in recounting the appellants' unavailing attempts to
obtain habeas relief from the state Chancellor. 261 U.S. at 92. By contrast, the dissenting
opinion of Justice McReynolds, joined by Justice Sutherland, bristles with references to
jurisdiction in arguing that appellants' only remedy was direct review. Id. at 94-96
(quoting Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915)). The citation of Moore and Johnson
may have been meant to convey that the Court was aware of the due process issue in
Kalb; if so, the effort was not one of Justice Black's more successful endeavors.
216. See note 131 supra.
217. But see pp. 209-10 and notes 209 & 211 supra (arguing that original action in
Kalb not conducted in accord with due process).
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ruptcy Act, 218 Congress attempted to eliminate a method by which
unscrupulous creditors took advantage of newly discharged bankrupts.
After the close of the bankruptcy proceedings the creditor would sue
in state court on the prebankruptcy obligation. 2"11 Since the discharge
was not self-executing, but merely established an affirmative defense
to actions on the discharged debt,220 the bankrupt-generally without
funds for an attorney and placing great faith in his discharge-would
frequently suffer a default judgment.2 21 He could not defeat enforce-
ment of that judgment by asserting his discharge, for under the rules
of claim preclusion 222 the defense of discharge in bankruptcy, like all
other affirmative defenses, merges into the default judgment.22 And
even if the bankrupt did not default his victory was not assured, for
the creditor could assert that the debt was nondischargeable. 22' The
issue of dischargeability would then be determined in the state court.
Some bankrupts did contest the action against them and sustain their
discharge. But many did not, and the inequity of the system had raised
great concern.
22-
To meet this problem Congress enacted a scheme whereby the
question of dischargeability of any debt would be determinable in
the bankruptcy court.2 26 Moreover, certain frequently abused grounds
for nondischargeability 227 were made determinable only by the bank-
ruptcy court,228 and only within a limited period during the bank-
218. Pub. L. No. 91-467, 84 Stat. 990 (1970) (amending §§ 2, 14, 15, 17, 38, 58 of
the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 11, 32, 33, 35, 66, 94 (1970)) [hereinafter cited by
Bankruptcy Act section only].
219. See Bankruptcy: Hearings on S.J. Res. 88, H.R. 6665 and H.R. 12250 Before Sub-
comm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as Hearings] (statement of Edward Weinfeld, United States District Judge,
S.D.N.Y.); id. at 46-49 (statement of Clive Bare, Referee in Bankruptcy, E.D. Tenn.);
Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 1-10 (1971). Professor
Countryman was a draftsman of the 1970 Amendments. See id. at 23.
220. Hearings, supra note 219, at 52 (interchange between Rep. Wiggins and Daniel
Cowans, President, National Conf. of Referees in Bankruptcy). See N.Y. Civ. Pakc. LxW
§ 3018(b) (McKinney 1974) (pleading discharge); FED R. Civ. P. 8(c) (same).
221. Hearings, supra note 219, at 25 (Weinfeld statement); id. at 34 (Cowans state-
ment); id. at 47 (Bare statement).
222. See note 119 supra.
223. Countryman, supra note 219, at 5, 10.
224. The circumstances under which a debt is nondischargeable are enumerated in
§ 17(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970).
225. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 219, at 12 (statement of Ernest Friesen, Dir.,
Admin. Off. of United States Courts) ("worst defect in the Bankruptcy Act"); id. at 25
(Weinfeld statement) (opportunity to provide bankrupt fresh start with clean slate lost).
226. Bankruptcy Act § 17(c).
227. Fraud by false pretenses or use of a false financial statement, or "willful and
malicious" conversion of property, § 17(a)(2); fraud by a fiduciary, § 17(a)(4); "willful
and malicious" injury to persons or property, § 17(a)(8).
228. See § 17(c)(2). The statutory language is somewhat ambiguous, but the intent is
clear. See Countryman, supra note 219, at 26.
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ruptcy proceedings.229 If the creditor did not move for a determination
of nondischargeability, he could not assert any of the enumerated
grounds in a subsequent action.
230
The scheme is enforced in two ways. First, the order of discharge
is to enjoin all creditors from suing on discharged debts. 23 1 Second,
the order must declare
that any judgment theretofore or thereafter obtained in any
other court is null and void as a determination of the personal
liability of the bankrupt with respect to any of the following: (a)
debts not excepted from the discharge under [§ 17(a)]; (b) debts
[automatically] discharged under [§ 17(c)(2)]; and (c) debts de-
termined to be discharged under [§ 17(c)(3)]. 232
The provision for the injunction is salutary, but in light of the pre-
ceding discussion of judicial power the null-and-void declaration vio-
lates the Tenth Amendment. That declaration apparently would per-
mit a debtor facing a state court suit on a prebankruptcy debt to
ignore the suit entirely and treat the ensuing judgment as a "letter
to a newspaper" whether or not he could have defended the suit when
it was instituted..2 33 In other words, the Amendments place debtors
229. See §§ 14(b)(1), 17(c)(2).
230. § 17(c)(2).
231. § 14(f)(2).
232. § 14(f)(1). The three categories do not, taken together, guarantee a final de-
termination of the dischargeability of every debt at the time the decree is entered.
In addition to debts excepted under § 17(a)(1), (3), (5), (6), (7) and not submitted for
determination under § 17(c)(1), there are those claims against the bankrupt that, in the
language of the Bankruptcy Act, are not "debts" at all, because they are not provable.
See §§ 1(14), 63. Indeed, the Amendments explicitly provide for reopening bankruptcy
cases for determinations of dischargeability. § 17(c)(6); see Countryman, supra note
219, at 30-31.
233. See Countryman, supra note 219, at 47-48; Comment, Bankruptcy: Effect of the
1970 Bankruptcy Act Amendments on the Discharge that Never Was, 1971 WIs. L. REV.
1174, 1185-87 (1971). Professor Countryman has presented the following illustration ef
the operation of § 14(f):
After Debtor gets his bankruptcy discharge, Creditor takes judgment in a non-
bankruptcy court. Debtor, who had not applied to the bankruptcy court for a de-
termination of dischargeability, does not now apply to the bankruptcy court for
such a determination and for an injunction, as he might do, but defends the action.
Judgment is entered for Creditor. Debtor does not appeal, but now applies to the
bankruptcy court for a determination of dischargeability and injunctive relief. Tra-
ditional application of the doctrine of res judicata would lead to the conclusion
that the matter may not be relitigated in the bankruptcy court, whether or not
Debtor pleaded his discharge as a defense to the action. But what is the meaning
of the provision that new § 14f puts in every discharge? Any judgment "theretofore
or thereafter entered is null and void as a determination of the personal liability
of the bankrupt" ..... [T]he intent of § 14f apparently is that if the creditor asserts
that his claim is nondischargeable because within any of the exceptions specified in
§ 17a the prior nonbankruptcy adjudication is not res judicata.
Countryman, supra note 219, at 47-48 (footnotes omitted).
This hypothetical achieved actuality in In re Kaid, 347 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Va. 1972).
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in the same position of absolute immunity to state process as were
the Kalbs; the corollary-deprivation of state judicial power-is the
same in both cases. It is clear from the legislative history that Con-
greis intended to create that immunity,23 4 but to the extent that the
statute attempts to divest state courts of their place in the judicial
system, it cannot stand against the Tenth Amendment.23a
Sears, Roebuck 9- Co. held a security interest in some household goods purchased by
Kaid; when Kaid filed a bankruptcy petition Sears obtained leave to repossess its col-
lateral. The goods could not be found, however, and Sears filed a detinue action in
state court. Kaid appeared and defended the action, represented by his bankruptcy counsel,
and suffered judgment based upon an explicit finding of willful conversion. He then
moved to reopen the bankruptcy case, have Sears held in contempt for prosecuting the
state action after discharge, have the state judgment declared null and void and its
enforcement enjoined, and obtain an attorney's fee for and costs of the state action.
The court granted all the requests except the last, relying on the null-and-void pro-
vision of § 14(f)(1). 347 F. Supp. at 543. But the court denied the attorney's fee and
costs, agreeing with the state court's finding of willful conversion by Kaid and noting
in addition that Kaid had slept on his rights. Id. at 544. Since Sears had also slept on
its rights by not returning to the bankruptcy court after the repossession attempt failed,
both parties had unclean hands; but § 14(f) operated to require the bankruptcy court-
a court of equity-to restore to the perpetrator of a fraud the benefits of his scheme.
This case, the outlines of which were clearly contemplated by the draftsmen of the
statute, illustrates the wrongness of the voidness doctrine, whatever one may think of
its constitutionality. Not only does the doctrine constitute a direct attack on state ju-
dicial power, it also produces results which bear little relation to concepts such as
fairness or equity.
234. See note 233 supra. The voidness provision and the injunction provision were
in neither of the draft statutes under consideration in the 1969 hearings, see Hearings,
supra note 219, at 52, but Rep. Wiggins expressed concern that the exclusive juris-
diction provisions would be meaningless without some easily available coercive means
of enforcement. Id. at 52-55. The bill was redrafted in the three weeks following the
close of the hearings, see Countryman, supra note 219, at 22-23, and the new bill con-
tained § 14(f) in its present form. See Hearings, supra note 219, at 92-93 (letter from
Lawrence P. King to Byron G. Rogers, Subcomm. Chairman; copy of new draft bill).
235. The only Tenth Amendment problem considered by the draftsmen was whether
submission of an inchoate alimony claim for determination of nondischargeability would
involve the bankruptcy court directly in domestic relations cases if it were to proceed
to judgment under the seemingly mandatory language of § 17(c)(3). See Countryman,
supra note 219, at 33-34. But Professor Countryman is no doubt correct in concluding
that this provision "should not be, and is not likely to be, construed as an attempt of
doubtful constitutionality to confer upon the bankruptcy courts, alone among all federal
courts, jurisdiction to grant divorces, determine paternity, adjudicate custody rights, and
fix the amount of alimony and support obligations." Id. at 34. See IA J. MooRE & L.
KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY r 17.28A[4], at 1742.4 (14th ed. 1976) (in rare case bank-
ruptcy court may remit trial of remaining issues because of complexity or specialized
nature of claim); cf. In re Waller, 494 F.2d 447, 452 (6th Cir. 1974) (in alimony case
bankruptcy court "should act with caution in order not to abuse the balance between
the state and federal relationship [sic]"). Professor King has characterized the injunction
remedy as "perhaps [the] more important" of the two, IA J. MOORE & L. KING, supra
r 14.69, at 1453, but it is clear that little if any thought was given to whether the loidness
remedy was constitutional. The only hint of doubt appears in the Countryman hypo-
thetical discussed in note 233 supra. Professor Countryman argues that "[t]here is no
apparent reason why Congress cannot . . .provide [the voidness remedy]" in such a
case since federal/state full faith and credit is merely statutory. Countryman, supra
note 219, at 48. But questions of validity of state judgments do have constitutional
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Fortunately, the unconstitutionality of the null-and-void declara-
tion will not jeopardize the well-considered scheme of which it is a
part: discharged bankrupts will not be returned to the mercy of their
former creditors. Loss of the voidness remedy will have little effect
on the substantive provisions of the statute. There is nothing con-
stitutionally objectionable in the provision for the injunction against
subsequent suits; it is a form of relief long known in equity.2 36 The
injunction is enforceable via contempt proceedings. 237 Hence, if the
bankrupt applies to the bankruptcy court before the creditor's action
goes to judgment, there would be no constitutional problem in en-
joining further prosecution of that action. Indeed, such an injunction
could be directed against the state court itself,235 thereby obviating
most problems of enforcement against a creditor possibly already once
in contempt. 39 There would then be ample time to bring the creditor
into the bankruptcy court and either try him for contempt (if the
debt was covered by the discharge injunction) or determine the issue
of dischargeability and proceed to judgment.2 40 Moreover, even after
stature. See pp. 197-200 supra. Cf. Degnan, supra note 39, at 749 (if statutory full faith
and credit did not exist Supreme Court would have had to invent it). It follows that
§ 14(0(1) is unconstitutional.
236. The suit to quiet title, for example, grew up precisely to restrain abusive ac-
tions at law. See D. LoUISELL & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 218.
237. See In re Kaid, 347 F. Supp. 540, 543 (E.D. Va. 1972) (holding creditor in
"technical contempt").
238. Bankruptcy injunctions are "expressly authorized" exceptions to the strictures
of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
314 U.S. 118, 132-33 (1941). To date, the Younger Doctrine, see p. 186 & note 114
supra, has not been held applicable to bankruptcy injunctions. But cf. Juidice v. Vail,
97 S. Ct. 1211 (1977) (Younger Doctrine bars suit brought by judgment debtors under
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (held an "expressly authorized" exception to
§ 2283 in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972)), seeking to enjoin continuation of
allegedly unconstitutional state procedure whereby judgment creditors may depose judg-
ment debtors). Moreover, federal injunctions to protect discharges were given explicit
sanction, at least in "unusual circumstances," during the period before 1970, when dis-
chargeability was litigable in state courts. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 241-42
(1934). See Countryman, supra note 219, at 3. The stated purpose of the 1970 Amendments
was to remove the "unusual circumstances" provision from the Local Loan doctrine so
that the doctrine would apply as a matter of course. See National Bankr. Conf., Ex-
planatory Memorandum to Accompany Bill Amending Sections 2, 14, 15, 17, 38 and
58 of the Bankruptcy Act, in Hearings, supra note 219, at 95, 97, reprinted in [1970] U.S.
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 4161, 4163.
239. Whether the creditor was in fact in contempt might depend on whether he had
a good faith belief that the debt was not covered by the discharge decree, but it would
be almost impossible for a commercial creditor such as a finance company to have such
a belief unless the debt were not on the bankrupt's schedule of debts, see §§ 14(f)(1)(a),
17(a)(3). All other exceptions to discharge normally applicable to such a creditor are
automatically foreclosed under § 17(c)(2).
240. All that would be required to effectuate this scheme is clear and insistent notice
to the bankrupt, in the discharge decree itself, that he cannot afford to ignore subsequent
suits, but that he will be protected easily and cheaply if he applies to the bankruptcy
court. See Countryman, supra note 219, at 45-46.
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judgment in the creditor's action, the bankrupt could move in the
bankruptcy court to enjoin enforcement of the judgment if he could
show some acceptable excuse for not having proceeded before judg-
ment.2 4 ' What is not permissible is for the bankrupt to ignore the
state action entirely, with no excuse whatsoever, and then at some
time in the future move to have the judgment declared null and
void.2 42 That would indeed be a destruction of the judgmental finality
guaranteed to state courts by the Tenth Amendment. Congress was
worried that bankrupts might sleep on their rights and lose them, but
it solved the main problem with its provision that the bankruptcy
court might determine dischargeability, and it provided adequate
means of enforcing the solution via the injunction against further
suits.
C. Fidelity: The Decision that Should Not Have Been
In Fidelity the Court invalidated a judgment against the United
States as trustee for the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations. Both the
Government and the Indians were protected by sovereign immunity;
since the failure of their counsel to raise the issue of immunity in
the prior suit was ineffective as a waiver of immunity, "the attempted
exercise of judicial power [was] void. ' 243 The case is a more difficult
one than Kalb since sovereign immunity is arguably not subject to
judicial determination at all. The same separation of powers argument
that permits judicial decisions to be free from legislative or executive
revision may be turned against the judiciary here. Courts may be
regarded as on notice that whenever they deal with a sovereign they
may be treading outside their assigned path. This argument, how-
ever, is not as persuasive as it might be were it possible to say that
Congress had waived immunity grudgingly and had reserved to itself
the power to make the ultimate determination of waiver. But the
241. Bankruptcy courts are courts of equity, see, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234, 241-42 (1934), and "mistake, surprise and excusable neglect" are classic reasons
for equity to enjoin enforcement of a judgment. F. JAMES, supra note I, at 546. Given
the clear policy behind the amendments, especially the explicit recognition given to
the difficult position of a newly discharged bankrupt faced with a lawsuit, the bank-
ruptcy court is likely to be disposed to find an excuse. This case-by-case treatment, no
matter how liberally applied, is conceptually different from an a priori determination
of voidness. Inquiry into conduct of litigants is process oriented, and is therefore in
accord with the theory of this Note.
242. See note 233 supra.
243. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940); see
p. 177 supra. The lack of competence of federal officials to waive sovereign immunity is
standard doctrine. Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 233 (1887); Case v. Terrell, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 199, 202-03 (1871).
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various federal waivers of immunity244 have a broad scope24 5 and,
equally important, are not limited to proceedings in the Court of
Claims. 2 463 Indeed, the holding in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok that the
Court of Claims is an Article III court24 7 implies that the scope of
the immunity, like justiciability and other limits on judicial com-
petence, is an issue for judicial determination.24 8 A similar conclusion
is warranted concerning Eleventh Amendment questions when a state
appears in federal court. There are long lines of cases on both sides
of the immunity issue, which involve such questions as implied con-
244. E.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, clh. 753. tit. IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as
amended primarily at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)); Tucker
Act, clh. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1970
& Supp. V 1975) and elsewhere in Title 28).
245. See Note, An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort, 50 S. CAL. L.
REv. 515, 517 n.12 (1977) ("the federal government has, in general, consented to be sued").
246. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1970) (concurrent jurisdiction of district courts and
Court of Claims); id. § 1346(b) (exclusive jurisdiction of district courts of suits under
Federal Tort Claims Act). There had been at least a partial legislative waiver in Fidelity,
with respect to both the federal government and the Indians, but the waiver was limited
to the District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, the successor to the terri-
torial court for Indian Territory. Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, § 18, 34 Stat. 134 (waiver);
Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, §§ 13-20, 34 Stat. 275 (1906) (establishing succession
from territorial court to district court). It is not absolutely clear from the statutes
whether the waiver was to devolve on the federal courts or the state courts after state-
hood. Compare id. §§ 13, 16 (federal courts) with id. § 19 (state courts). But the Fidelity
Court appeared to assume that the original judgment would have been valid had it been
entered by the Oklahoma federal court. See 309 U.S. at 513. This was the court in
which the Government sued on the bond and in which the receiver intervened and
counterclaimed on his judgment from the bankruptcy court. Thus the only question
in the second suit was whether to give effect to the prior judgment as establishing the
claim or to require instead that the receiver prove his claim from scratch. The Court
chose the second alternative, but its attempt to explain why the waiver was to be
viewed as effective only in the Oklahoma court is, in the context of a prior final
judgment, unconvincing. The Court held that the waiver was conditioned on permitting
the Indians to try their lawsuits close to home, 309 U.S. at 513, but the Court failed to
take into account the fact that the Indians were the plaintiffs in the original action.
On the other hand, the Indians did not choose that forum, since the decree was en-
tered in an ongoing bankruptcy proceeding. Such delicate questions might well be
crucial to an appeal of the bankruptcy decree, but in light of the discussion at pp. 188-90
supra, it is difficult to see why those questions should survive a final judgment. The
Court did not attempt to balance finality against sovereign immunity but merely as-
serted that "without legislative action the doctrine of immunity should prevail." 309
U.S. at 515.
247. 370 U.S. 530, 552-58, 584 (1962) (plurality opinion). There was a majority of the
Court on this point. See id. at 585-89 (Clark, J., joined by Warren, C.J., concurring in
result).
248. Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.S. 494 (1941) (determination in prior suit
that partnership not "enemy" within meaning of Trading with the Enemy Act, and that
partnership therefore entitled to sue Alien Property Custodian under Act, may not be
attacked by Government in suit to set aside decree); United States v. Eastport S.S. Corp.,
255 F.2d 795, 802-05 (2d Cir. 1958) (Court of Claims determination that it had jurisdiction,
in face of Government assertion that administrative procedure provided exclusive mode
of redress for claimant, binding on Government; subsequent action barred by Govern-
ment's failure to assert compulsory counterclaim in Court of Claims action); see pp. 193-
91 & notes 139-42 supra.
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sent to suit.24 9 The absence of a blanket ban on suits, taken with
the problems inherent in determining whether to imply consent to
suit, establishes that the question of Eleventh Amendment immunity
is again one to be resolved judicially.2 50
The holding in Fidelity therefore fails to recognize the extent of
judicial power, and it follows that it should be rejected. Yet it is also
bad law for another reason-a reason that illustrates the essential in-
sensitivity of the voidness doctrine to the interests it purports to
advance.
In Fidelity, somebody made a mistake. The Government's counsel
did not plead immunity in the first action and did not appeal the
decree, and as a result two sovereign entities suffered a money judg-
ment. Whether one reads the Supreme Court's voidness language lit-
erally or whether one agrees with Professor Dobbs that the case stands
for the proposition that "the public treasury should not be raided
by res judicata," 251 the operative fact is that the Government and the
Indians were allowed to avoid the consequences of a mistake of coun-
sel that would have bound anyone else. But the American doctrine
of sovereign immunity-at least with respect to money judgments-
stands squarely on protecting the integrity of the public fisc.2 52 The
249. E.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (operation of railroad
by state implies consent to suit under Federal Employers' Liability Act). See Note, A
Practical View of the Eleventh Amendment-Lower Court Interpretations and the Su-
preme Court's Reaction, 61 GEo. L.J. 1473, 1498 (1973) ("The single most overwhelming
fact about Eleventh Amendment cases is their complete confusion.")
250. Cf. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 309 (1947) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring in result) (issues of jurisdiction "peculiarly fit for judicial determination").
The situation might well be different if a state court judgment against the United
States were called into question. The United States has waived immunity to certain suits
in state courts, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1970) (actions affecting property on which United
States has a lien), but the waivers have been in no way as comprehensive as the waivers
for suits in federal court, for the general tort and contract waivers are restricted to
federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970) (district courts have exclusive jurisdiction of
Tort Claims suits); see id. §§ 1346(a), 1491 (jurisdiction of suits "not sounding in tort"
in district courts and Court of Claims). One may therefore regard state courts as on
notice that they may be acting beyond their power when they adjudicate claims against
the United States, that as far as the federal government is concerned "the judicial sys-
tem" means only the federal judicial system. Cf. id. § 2414 (district court judgments against
United States to be paid "on settlements by the General Accounting Office"; state
court judgments against United States to be paid on settlements "after certification by
the Attorney General that it is in the interest of the United States to pay the same").
The arguments of this Note imply, however, that it would be inappropriate to invoke
voidness to defeat a state judgment against the United States where the purported
jurisdictional base was at all colorable.
251. Bootstrap (pt. 2), supra note 79, at 1259.
252. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947) (suit is against sovereign if "judg-
ment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the
public administration"); cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-68 (1974) (test for
whether suit proscribed by Eleventh Amendment). See generally HART & WrCHSLER 1362-77.
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holding in Fidelity thus flies in the face of other cases where mistakes
of governmental officials have been held to bind the government to a
monetary loss.253
Two recent cases illustrate the fundamental inconsistency in al-
lowing sovereign immunity to survive and defeat a final judgment.
Jordan v. Gilligan- 4 arose out of a legislative reapportionment suit
in federal court in Ohio. After a plan had been finally approved by
the district court, the successful plaintiffs filed an application for
attorneys' fees; the Ohio Attorney General had had notice of the ap-
lication, but did nothing and the application was granted without
objection. The state refused to pay the judgment 2:5 and the plaintiffs
obtained a writ of fiere facias against one of the state's bank accounts.
At this point the state finally256 moved, pursuant to Rule 60(b),257 to
vacate the award of fees on the ground that it was prohibited by the
Eleventh Amendment and therefore void. The district court denied
the motion, in part because the state's failure to act earlier created
a res judicata barrier to its claim of Eleventh Amendment protec-
253. In United States v. National Exch. Bank, 270 U.S. 527 (1926) (Holmes, J.), a
check drawn by the United States on itself in the amount of $47.50 was fraudulently
raised to $4750, and the Government paid the higher amount to an innocent holder.
When the error was discovered the Government sought to recover from the endorsee
bank, although a private drawee would have been barred from recovery because the
drawer and drawee were the same. The Government argued that the integrity of the
public fisc was at stake and that "the hand that drew and the hand that was to pay
were not the same," id. at 534, but the Court denied recovery because "[t]he United
States does business on business terms." Id. Accord, Keck v. Browne, 314 Ky. 151, 234
S.W.2d 183 (1950). See also United States v. Hadden, 192 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1951) (absent
clear contrary statutory intent, Government suit to recover money paid by mistake must
be ruled by general law of restitution). It would appear to follow that if a "mistake"
has become embodied in a final judgment there is even less reason to permit the
Government to retrieve its error, and the Government has indeed been held bound
by procedural errors of its counsel. E.g., United States v. Eastport S.S. Corp., 255 F.2d
795 (2d Cir. 1958) (failure to assert compulsory counterclaim in prior suit in Court
of Claims bars later suit for damages); cf. In re 73rd Precinct Station House, 329 F.
Supp. 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (remanding action to state court because Government's re-
moval petition untimely, Government waived right to remove, and action not within
original jurisdiction of district courts). But cf. White v. Adler, 289 N.Y. 34, 44, 43
N.E.2d 798, 802 (1942) (liability created by state should not be extinguished by appli-
cation of rule of merger where mistake by state official led to suit on less than full
obligation).
254. 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).
255. Id. at 704. The State of Ohio was not a named defendant in the original action,
but the Governor was, and the Attorney General had managed the defense. The judgment
for fees was entered against the State, but at no point was the fact that it was not
formally a party deemed crucial to the power vel non of the district court to enter
judgment against the state. See id. at 704-05 & n.3.
256. It was over eight months after the judgment for the fees was entered. Id. at 704.
257. FRD. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see note 45 supra.
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tion.25s But the Sixth Circuit reversed and held the judgment void.2 1
The court remarked that the state's Eleventh Amendment rights could,
under Ohio law, be waived only by the legislature,260 and concluded
that the state's delay in attacking the judgment was therefore im-
material.
261
If the courts of the United States could under no circumstances
entertain proceedings against a state, then it might be possible to re-
gard Jordan as a legitimate holding of an absolute lack of judicial
power. But the federal courts are not so restricted, 26 2 and the proceed-
ing for fees was ancillary to a reapportionment proceeding over which
the court had unquestioned jurisdiction. 263 It is therefore difficult
to see how the decision in Jordan can be maintained on grounds of
lack of judicial power, and this difficulty is compounded by a com-
parison with In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation,264 which
also involved negligence in the Ohio Attorney General's office.
Four Seasons was one phase of complicated litigation charging vio-
lations of the securities laws. Numerous actions were consolidated
and transferred to the Western District of Oklahoma, where the con-
solidated action was certified as a class action. Ohio was a member
of a plaintiff class in the consolidated action and was plaintiff both
in a related suit in its own courts and in an untransferred suit in the
Southern District of Ohio. Settlement negotiations began in the con-
solidated action, and "[v]arious attorneys for the State of Ohio, in-
cluding the Attorney General, participated in one or more of these
discussions .... ,,261 An agreement was reached, apparently founded
in part on the assumption that Ohio would opt out as a class member
and proceed with the pending suits in the Ohio courts. Notice of
the settlement reached the Attorney General's office, but, due to a
misunderstanding among the lawyers there, Ohio failed to opt out.
When it received notice of entry of judgment it did not appeal, but
258. See 500 F.2d at 710. The other bases for the district court's holding are not
given; presumably it felt there was no immunity to begin with.
259. Id. at 704, 710. The court relied on Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974),
which denied, on Eleventh Amendment grounds, "restitution" of welfare benefits with-
held in contravention of federal regulations.
260. 500 F.2d at 708.
261. Id. at 710. The court also held that res judicata was not a bar to a 60(b) attack.
Id. For a discussion of 60(b) attacks arguing that jurisdiction is no more relevant to
60(b) attacks than it is to other attacks, see p. 224 infra.
262. See pp. 217-18 supra.
263. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-204 (1962).
264. 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974). The full history of the
litigation is set out in two opinions of the district court. 59 F.R.D. 667 (W.D. Okla. 1973),
rev'd, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974); 58 F.R.D. 19 (W.D.
Okla. 1972).
265. 59 F.R.D. at 673.
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instead filed a motion to vacate pursuant to Rule 60(b). The district
court granted the motion; the court cited the reasonable explanations
for the negligence of Ohio's counsel and the possibility that the state's
interests were not adequately protected by the class representatives
during the final settlement negotiations. 066 Neither factor alone was
conclusive, but the court decided that "the totality of the evidence
requires that Ohio be relieved from the operation of the judgment. '0 7
The Tenth Circuit reversed. It read the lower court's opinion as ad-
dressing a due process issue, and it found that due process had been
satisfied because Ohio had had " 'both actual and constructive knowl-
edge of the settlement and . . . took no steps to object to [it] prior
to the entry of the judgment.' ",208
The similarity between the circumstances of Jordan and Four Sea-
sons is striking. Both cases involved neglect and delay by Ohio's
counsel, which led to entry of a judgment against Ohio's financial
interest. In Jordan the district court was held obligated to vacate
because the judgment was "void," whereas the district court in Four
Seasons was held to have abused its discretion in vacating despite a
much lower degree of culpability on the part of counsel for Ohio
than was evident in Jordan.269 Whatever view is taken of the proper
balance to be struck between the need for finality in class actions
and the liberal purpose of Rule 60(b) to accomplish substantial jus-
tice, the analyses in Four Seasons, both in the court below and on
appeal, are much more to the point than was the mechanical invo-
cation of the voidness doctrine in Jordan. Ohio slept on its rights in
Jordan, but the voidness doctrine, in the form of a highly controver-
sial Eleventh Amendment claim, 270 saved the day. In Four Seasons
266. Id. at 683.
267. Id. (footnote omitted).
268. 502 F.2d at 844 (quoting Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425 F.2d 1059, 1061
(7th Cir. 1970)).
269. The delay was eight months in Jordan compared with less than a month in
Four Seasons. In addition, the district court in Four Seasons found the negligence by
Ohio's counsel understandable, if not excusable within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1).
59 F.R.D. at 679, 683.
270. There has been considerable disagreement among the circuits on the substan-
tive issue under Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), of the taxability of attorneys'
fees as costs in suits against states or state officials, and the position taken by the Sixth
Circuit is a minority one. Accord, Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 44 (3d Cir.
1974) (barring fees on remand if college found to be state agency), vacated, 421 U.S. 983
(1975); Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway
Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017, 1026 (5th Cir. 1974) (barring fees under Edelman), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 926 (1975). Contra, Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3, 6-8 (4th Cir. 1975) (granting
fees); Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (Ist Cir.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Jordan
v. Fusari, 496 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1974) (Eleventh Amendment claim, waived as to damages,
cannot bar claim for fees); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1974)
(granting fees against state official acting in official capacity). The question may have been
temporarily mooted as a result of the decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
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Ohio's counsel may well have been "lulled" into misunderstanding
the nature of settlement negotiations, 27 1 but there was no question
of jurisdiction and the state lost. The mechanical nature of the ap-
plication of the voidness doctrine is typical of the doctrine itself; it
provides persuasive evidence that the doctrine not only fails to achieve
the goals it sets for itself, but also produces random inequities along
the way. Such a doctrine deserves finally to be laid to rest.
IV. Replacing Voidness
A. Jurisdiction as a Defense on the Merits
The preceding discussion has indicated that the proper resolution
of the tension between finality and justice is not served by treating
questions of jurisdiction as questions of power. Instead of retaining
a voidness doctrine that permits diversion of discussion to questions
of power, courts should return to the principles enunciated in Stoll
v. Gottlieb,272 Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 273
and Durfee v. Duke,27 4 and reject attacks on judgments based on an
asserted want of subject-matter jurisdiction in the rendering court.
The goal of justice in dispute resolution is adequately served by treat-
ing lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter as a defense on the
merits, a defense in which the court has an independent interest and
can address sua sponte. This approach recognizes and maintains the
strong independent interest of the judiciary in preserving jurisdic-
tional allocations, but it does not lose sight of the nature of judicial
power. When a member of the judicial system has entered a judgment
in proceedings conducted in accord with due process, and that judg-
ment has become final, the judicial process has ended. The power
to settle disputes is granted to the judicial system as a whole; which of
its members has spoken is immaterial after final settlement.
The operational implications of treating jurisdiction as a defense
accord well with this Note's theory of judicial power. 275 It is a com-
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), restricting the general power of federal courts to grant at-
torneys' fees. See, e.g., Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 421 U.S. 983 (1975), vacating and
remanding 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974). But the conflict is raging again since the passage
of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641
(amending 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West June, 1977 Pamph.)). Compare Skehan v. Board of
Trustees, 46 U.S.L.W. 2045 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 1977) (denying fees) with Finney v. Hutto,
548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977) (granting fees) and Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension
Serv., 424 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (granting fees).
271. 59 F.R.D. at 683.
272. 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
273. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
274. 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
275. There is one technical problem with this treatment. A dismissal of a claim
"on the merits" operates as an adjudication in favor of defendant and invokes the rule
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monplace that a defense on the merits may not serve as a basis for
an attack on a judgment.2 6 By contrast, Stoll, Chicot, and Durfee
treat the question of a judgment's validity as an issue apart from the
judgment itself; that is, an issue that might well be foreclosed by
the judgment itself but one that, as Kalb and Fidelity show, need
not be.277 This treatment will frequently lead to the same results as
the defense-on-the-merits approach, but it does not give effect to the
full implications of judicial power. A judgment of a member of the
judicial system simply is valid unless there is some underlying due
process violation.
of bar, SECOND RESTATEMENT § 48, comment a, but a dismissal for want of jurisdiction
does not, id. § 48.1(1)(a). It is clearly undesirable for a plaintiff who brought his claim
in the wrong forum to be barred from then bringing it in an appropriate forum. But
that would not happen under the proposal put forward here.
In order to determine what is barred by an adjudication for defendant, it is necessary
to determine what claim was brought. But if one includes the jurisdiction of the forum
as an element of the claim, which is the proposal being made here, then a claim arising
out of the same transaction but brought in a different forum is to some extent a dif-
ferent claim than the original one. Thus, a state court dismissal of a patent claim on
the ground that the jurisdiction over such a claim is exclusively federal extinguishes
only the right to bring that claim in any state court. On the other hand, where juris-
dictional language is used to withdraw substantive rights (for example, the legislative
overruling of the Portal-to-Portal cases, discussed at HART & WECHSLER 322-24), a dis-
missal for "want of jurisdiction" extinguishes the entire substantive claim. The rules of
claim preclusion, see note 119 supra, are easily flexible enough to handle this problem.
There is another and perhaps simpler way to analyze this problem, which leads to
the same result. Claim preclusion deals with things that could have been litigated, and
a dismissal for want of subject-matter jurisdiction is precisely a statement as to what
could and could not have been litigated. Therefore, in order to determine what is
precluded, one need only determine the basis for dismissal.
276. See F. JAiEs, supra note 1, at 570; FiRST RESTATEMENT § 47, comment a; SECOND
RESTATEMENT § 47(b). The existence of a meritorious defense, however, is a prerequisite
to some forms of attack. See F. JAMES, supra note i, at 546.
277. The Court has used different modes of analysis in different cases, and its rules
have been somewhat ad hoc. In StoU and Durfee the emphasis was strongly on the
issue preclusion aspects; the jurisdictional issues had been litigated thoroughly and
there was therefore no justification for reopening them. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106,
115 (1963); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938). On the other hand, Chicot and
the divorce cases-Sherrer and Coe-emphasize opportunity to litigate, which is the
cornerstone of claim preclusion. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1948); Chicot
County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 378 (1940). It is likely that
the issue preclusion rule is the correct interpretation of the Court's opinions in this
area, if one may regard opinions spanning twenty-five years and a changing Court
as susceptible to one "correct" interpretation. "Actually litigated" is the hallmark of
issue preclusion, see SECOND RESTATEMENT § 68, and in the three cases raising the most
serious policy implications-Durfee, kalb, and Fidelity-the question of whether the issue
had been litigated may have been decisive. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 113-14 &
n.12 (1963). Moreover, issue preclusion will occasionally be denied simply because the
shape of the new litigation suggests that a redetermination would be appropriate. E.g.,
Henderson v. Bardahl Int'l Corp., 72 Wash. 2d 109, 119, 431 P.2d 961, 967-68 (1967)
(collateral estoppel denied to prevent "windfall" recovery). See SECOND RESTATEMENT §
68.1(b)(ii); pp. 206-07 & notes 197-200 supra. Thus the Court's absolutist position in
Kalb may be seen to fit, if perhaps somewhat uneasily, with modern views of issue
preclusion.
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B. Applying the Test: Federal Rule 60(b)(4)
Rule 60(b)(4)278 expressly incorporates the voidness doctrine into
the Federal Rules, and it has been held that there is no room for
discretion in applying that subsection.2 79 It will therefore be instruc-
tive to consider the defense-on-the-merits approach as applied to post-
judgment motions to vacate, brought in the court that rendered the
judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b) or similar state practice.280 The in-
stitutional and philosophical bases of preclusion theory both incline
toward granting such attacks favored status. Proceedings in the render-
ing court avoid intrasystem squabbling and eliminate the problem of
having to choose between two outstanding determinations of an issue.
But it does not follow that a 60(b) attack should automatically permit a
reopening of the question of the rendering court's jurisdiction, for
there is still a final judgment to contend with.
There is no reason that the criteria for reaching jurisdictional ques-
tions on 60(b) motions should be any different from those for reach-
ing any other defense. The first three subsections of Rule 60(b) are
derived from equity practice281 and provide common and sensible
reasons for reopening judgments-mistake, fraud, new evidence. They
focus the inquiry where it belongs: why was the issue not raised be-
fore judgment? Moreover, 60(b)(6), which permits "other reasons" to
justify vacation of the judgment, provides sufficient flexibility to meet
unforeseen circumstances.28 2 Hence if 60(b)(4) is to be kept, the in-
terpretation of "voidness" under the Rule can be limited to due
process violations. Jordan and Four Seasons demonstrate the folly of
a broader interpretation.28 3
The approach described in this Note, properly applied, should re-
sult in fewer successful attacks on judgments, in or out of the ren-
dering court. The attacks that do succeed, however, will be more
likely than at present to do so for reasons of fundamental justice.
278. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). See note 45 supra.
279. See, e.g., Jordan v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974). Cf. Heckathorn v.
Heckathorn, 77 N.M. 369, 423 P.2d 410 (1967) (decided under N.M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4)).
280. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 473 (West 1970); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW Rule 5015
(McKinney Supp. 1975).
281. See 2 J. STORY, supra note 33, at 172-73 (mistake, fraud, and accident).
282. This analysis applies equally as well to default judgments as to other judgments.
Courts are "disposed to vacate default judgments if they are presented with any rea-
sonable basis on which to do so." Siegel, Practice Commentary C3215:24, in N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 3215, at 880 (McKinney 1970). Given this policy, it is difficult to see why
a litigant who can show no such basis ought to be granted relief.
283. Professor Dobbs has advanced similar views concerning a 60(b) attack. See Beyond
Bootstrap, supra note 79, at 495-99.
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